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CAUSAL INFERENCE IN CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 
D. James Greiner∗ 
Civil rights litigation often concerns the causal effect of some characteristic on decisions 
made by a governmental or socioeconomic actor.  An analyst may be interested, for 
example, in the effect of victim race on jury imposition of the death penalty, in the effect 
of applicant gender on a firm’s hiring decisions, or in the effect of candidate ethnicity on 
election results.  For the past thirty years, such analyses have primarily been accom-
plished via a statistical technique known as regression.  But as it has been used in civil 
rights litigation, regression suffers from several shortcomings: it facilitates biased, result-
oriented thinking by expert witnesses; it encourages judges and litigators to believe that 
all questions are equally answerable; and it gives the wrong answer in situations in 
which such might be avoided.  These difficulties, and several others, all stem from the 
fact that regression does not begin with a paradigm for defining causal effects and for 
drawing causal inferences.  This Article argues for a wholesale change in thinking in this 
area, from a focus on regression coefficients to an explicit framework of causation called 
“potential outcomes.”  The potential outcomes paradigm of causal inference, which (for 
lawyers) may be analogized to but-for causation with a renewed emphasis on time, 
addresses many of the shortcomings of regression as the latter is currently used in civil 
rights litigation, and it does so within a framework courts, litigators, and juries can 
understand.  This Article explains regression and the potential outcomes paradigm and 
discusses the latter’s application in the death penalty, employment discrimination, and 
redistricting settings. 
“If they can get you asking the wrong questions, they don’t have to worry 
about answers.” 
   —  Thomas  Pynchon1 
 
n modern litigation, courts, attorneys, and expert witnesses use sta-
tistics in the hope of shedding light on questions of causation.  This 
is particularly true in the civil rights context, where repetition of simi-
lar events makes the use of data analysis techniques attractive.  The 
dialogue between law and quantitative methods in the civil rights area 
has lasted for decades, but few would characterize the relationship as 
happy.  The disquiet is evident on both sides.  As early as 1980, legal 
commentators concluded that many courts disregarded a substantial 
portion of statistical analyses they encountered in the employment dis-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  ∗  Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  Thanks to Sergio Campos, Heather 
Gerken, Don Greiner, Ellen Greiner, Sam Gross, Sam Hirsch, Dan Ho, Louis Kaplow, Jennifer 
Lewis, Andrew Martin, Chris Robinson, Matthew Stephenson, Cora True-Frost, Adrian Ver-
meule, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.  No one listed endorses 
this Article, and all mistakes are my own. 
  1  THOMAS PYNCHON, GRAVITY’S RAINBOW 251 (1973). 
I    
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crimination context.2  Twenty-five years later, a survey of Title VII3 
cases demonstrated that little has changed.4 
On the quantitative end, innovation has stagnated.  During the 
decade or so that the Supreme Court was placing its imprimatur on 
statistics in general and regression in particular as appropriate forms 
of evidence in Title VII cases,5 the academy was responding with 
scholarly examinations of quantitative issues arising in employment 
discrimination,6 capital punishment,7 redistricting,8 and other con-
texts.9  Quantitative analysts were convening panels and holding sym-
posia to make recommendations to improve judicial understanding 
and use of statistical methods in litigation.10  Those recommendations 
were ignored,11 however, and a perusal of the hornbooks and looseleafs 
discussing the use of statistics as evidence in civil rights litigation sug-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  2  See, e.g., Michael O. Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple Regression Studies in 
Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 737, 737 & n.5 (1980) (collecting cases in 
which judges ignored or expressed discomfort with statistical analyses). 
  3  Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). 
  4  Robert L. Nelson & Eric Bennett, Judicial Treatment of Statistical Evidence in Cases Alleg-
ing Racial Discrimination in Employment: Now (2000–2002) and Then (1980–82), at 3 (Mar. 20, 
2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (“[Courts] typically 
are skeptical of efforts by plaintiffs to use statistics to prove discrimination, although they also 
very frequently chide plaintiffs if they offer no statistical proof to bolster claims of disparate treat-
ment.”).  There have been occasional exceptions.  E.g., Vuyanich v. Republic Nat’l Bank of Dal-
las,  505 F. Supp. 224,  261–79 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (performing a rigorous analysis of the parties’ 
mathematical models), vacated, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984). 
  5  See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 398–404 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United 
States, 433 U.S. 299, 306–13 (1977); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337–40 
(1977). 
  6  See, e.g., Delores A. Conway & Harry V. Roberts, Regression Analyses in Employment Dis-
crimination Cases, in S TATISTICS  AND  THE  LAW  107 (Morris H. DeGroot et al. eds., 1986); 
Finkelstein,  supra note 2; Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings,  80 
COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980).  
  7  See, e.g., DAVID  C.  BALDUS  ET  AL.,  EQUAL  JUSTICE  AND  THE  DEATH  PENALTY:  A 
LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990). 
  8  See, e.g., Richard L. Engstrom & Michael D. McDonald, Quantitative Evidence in Vote Di-
lution Litigation: Political Participation and Polarized Voting, 17 URB. LAW. 369 (1985); Bernard 
Grofman et al., The “Totality of Circumstances Test” in Section 2 of the 1982 Extension of the Vot-
ing Rights Act: A Social Science Perspective, 7 LAW & POL’Y 199 (1985). 
  9  See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS & JAMES W.L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMI-
NATION (1980) (discussing quantitative issues in a range of legal areas); STATISTICS AND THE 
LAW, supra note 6 (discussing antitrust, school finance, environmental regulation).  
  10  See, e.g., AM.  STATISTICAL  ASS’N  COMM.  ON  LAW  AND  JUSTICE  STATISTICS,  PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE SECOND WORKSHOP ON LAW AND JUSTICE STATISTICS (Alan E. Gel-
fand ed., 1983); PANEL  ON  STATISTICAL  ASSESSMENTS  AS  EVIDENCE  IN  THE  COURTS, 
NAT’L  RESEARCH  COUNCIL,  THE  EVOLVING  ROLE  OF  STATISTICAL  ASSESSMENTS  AS 
EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS 1–16 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989); Discussion Meeting, The Role 
of the Statistician as an Expert Witness, 145 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y SER. A 395 (1982). 
  11  See Nelson & Bennett, supra note 4, at 4 (“The courts and the legal profession more broadly 
have not adopted the suggestions of the Panel on Statistical Assessments as Evidence in the 
Courts.”).    
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gests that the field is fixated on methods introduced decades ago, par-
ticularly regression,12 despite judicial dissatisfaction. 
Judicial reluctance to engage, though not excusable, is perhaps un-
derstandable, but the lack of progress on the quantitative end is more 
puzzling.  In the general area of quantitative analysis of socioeconomic 
phenomena (at least, outside the law), the Earth has moved in the past 
two decades.  The development of fast, inexpensive computers, as well 
as statistical techniques (such as hierarchical and Bayesian modeling) 
that take advantage of intense computation,13 has contributed to a 
revolution in the sophistication and complexity of the analysis of po-
litical, economic, and sociological data. 
Meanwhile, in the more specific area of drawing inferences of cau-
sation, a more fundamental and less technical change has occurred.  
Previously, research into causation in social science, especially in ob-
servational studies, depended on the same framework still used in civil 
rights litigation today: a near-fetishlike focus on regression coeffi-
cients.14  In language similar to that currently in statistics-and-
discrimination hornbooks and looseleafs,15 scholarly publications in 
nonlegal quantitative fields would periodically intone that regression 
coefficients demonstrate correlation only and that correlation does not 
equal causation.  They would nevertheless proceed to use causal lan-
guage, speaking in terms of the “effects” of variables after “controlling 
for” potential confounders; the “effects” were regression coefficients, 
and one controlled for potential confounders by including them in the 
right-hand side of a regression equation.16 
More recently, however, much cutting-edge causal research outside 
the law has moved away from regression coefficients toward what has 
become known as the “potential outcomes” framework.17  As discussed 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  12  For example, in employment, see RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE 
STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION ch. 6 (2006); and WALTER B. CONNOLLY, JR. ET AL., USE 
OF STATISTICS IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LITIGATION § 11.03 & apps. D–E 
(2008).  In redistricting, see the discussion in Appendix A of D. James Greiner, Ecological Infer-
ence in Voting Rights Act Disputes: Where Are We Now, and Where Do We Want To Be?,  47 
JURIMETRICS J. 115, 155–59 (2007). 
  13  See, e.g., Joseph B. Kadane & George G. Woodworth, Hierarchical Models for Employment 
Decisions, 22 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 182 (2004). 
  14  See William A. Darity, Jr. & Patrick L. Mason, Evidence on Discrimination in Employment: 
Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 63, 73–76 (collecting studies); 
Christopher Winship & Michael Sobel, Causal Inference in Sociological Studies, in HANDBOOK 
OF DATA ANALYSIS 481, 481 (Melissa Hardy & Alan Bryman eds., 2004). 
  15  See, e.g., CONNOLLY, JR. ET AL., supra note 12, § 11.03, at 11-8.2; PAETZOLD & WILL-
BORN, supra note 12, ch. 6, § 6.03, at 14–15. 
  16  See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
  17  See, e.g., Christopher Winship & Stephen L. Morgan, The Estimation of Causal Effects from 
Observational Data, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 659, 662 (1999); see also PANEL ON METHODS FOR AS-
SESSING DISCRIMINATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMI-
NATION 78 (Rebecca M. Blank et al. eds., 2004). 
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in greater detail below, the potential outcomes framework begins with 
a definition of a “causal effect,” not as a regression coefficient, but 
rather as a comparison of outcomes that would occur with, versus 
without, some “treatment.”  One can think in terms of a pill purporting 
to reduce blood pressure.  Because for any particular “unit” (for exam-
ple, a patient), an analyst can only observe one potential outcome (for 
example, blood pressure when the patient takes the pill), the challenge 
in causal inference is to fill in the outcome value that would have oc-
curred had the unit done other than it actually did (for example, blood 
pressure if the patient had taken a placebo). 
Judges, litigators, and expert witnesses rarely take notice of, much 
less adopt in some way, paradigmatic shifts in the social sciences, and 
often with good reason.  The near-total isolation of discrimination liti-
gation from a potential outcomes understanding of causation is never-
theless both surprising and unhealthy.  It is surprising because the 
fundamentals of the potential outcomes framework are familiar, per-
haps even instinctive, to any survivor of first year torts; as the above 
blood-pressure pill analogy illustrates, the simplest form of the para-
digm may be thought of as but-for causation with a special focus on 
time.18  The isolation is unhealthy because the framework can at least 
begin to address many problems festering in the application of statisti-
cal analysis to civil rights issues, and it can do so in a way accessible to 
adjudicators.  For example, a complaint among judges is that the opin-
ions of expert witnesses appear to be for sale.19  In the potential out-
comes framework, however, the primary focus is on reproducing an 
imagined randomized experiment, so most of the hard quantitative 
work should be accomplished before the analyst knows what answer 
the study will produce.  In other words, the framework allows an ex-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
    The potential outcomes paradigm has also been labeled a “counterfactual” definition of cau-
sality, PANEL  ON  METHODS  FOR  ASSESSING  DISCRIMINATION,  supra, at 78, although this 
term has been used to describe other frameworks.  As is true of most good ideas, ownership of the 
paradigm is disputed.  Credit has been given, variously, to Professor Donald Rubin, see Paul W. 
Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 945, 946 (1986), Professor Jerzy 
Neyman, see David A. Freedman, Graphical Models for Causation, and the Identification Prob-
lem, 28 EVALUATION REV. 267, 287 (2004), and multiple others, see James J. Heckman, Rejoin-
der: Response to Sobel, 35 SOC. METHODOLOGY 135, 138–39 (2005) (crediting various econo-
metricians); Michael E. Sobel, Discussion: “The Scientific Model of Causality,”  35 S OC. 
METHODOLOGY 99, 99–101 (2005) (spreading credit among various thinkers).  
  18  Part of the explanation for the disconnect between civil rights litigation and the potential 
outcomes framework may be the fact that several influential quantitative analysts who developed, 
articulated, or used the paradigm currently deny that any discussion of the causal effects of race, 
gender, or other immutable characteristics is well-defined.  See infra note 94. 
  19  See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (collecting references).  
Even if witnesses are not for sale, the practice of shopping for an expert with a favorable opinion 
is well known, e.g., Paul Meier, Damned Liars and Expert Witnesses, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N. 269, 
273–75 (1986), and is in fact encouraged by legal rules allowing parties to hire both consulting and 
testifying experts while shrouding the former’s analyses behind the work product privilege.    
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pert witness to commit to the most important aspects of a study before 
she knows whether it will favor the plaintiff or the defendant.  Judges 
may respond better to experts who testify (truthfully) that they com-
mitted to their analyses before knowing the results. 
There are other benefits to using the potential outcomes framework 
in civil rights litigation, particularly as compared to the current prac-
tice of addressing almost any problem with regression.  Regression can 
give the wrong answer, or contradictory answers, to questions lawyers 
and judges care about; for example, it may imply that a firm is dis-
criminating against men when in fact it is discriminating against 
women, or it may suggest that the firm is discriminating against both 
men and women at the same time.  In other situations, regression (par-
ticularly in more advanced forms) provides answers — such as conclu-
sions in terms of logarithms of odds ratios — that are difficult for 
judges and juries to interpret.  The potential outcomes paradigm suf-
fers less from these difficulties.  Because the framework begins with 
the inquiry into what would have happened had the perception of 
some characteristic (for example, race or gender) been different at a de-
fined time point, courts, juries, litigators, and experts need focus less 
attention on comprehending statistical minutiae. 
Further, regression provides no framework within which to assess 
whether sharp causal questions, questions linked to information in 
available data, have been articulated.  Before using any statistical 
technique, a quantitative analyst must articulate a question by trans-
lating the applicable legal standards and the background facts into an 
inquiry focusing on one or more quantities of interest, and must then 
assess whether available data have any information on these quanti-
ties.  It is hubris to suppose that our present knowledge of the world is 
such that we can analyze any situation with currently available quan-
titative methods, and it is downright foolish to suppose that we can 
tackle any problem with one set of techniques.  There are some situa-
tions as to which, at present, we can say nothing useful.  In contrast to 
regression, the potential outcomes understanding of causal inference 
helps analysts understand when they are unable to translate facts and 
law into a sharp causal question linked to available data.  Section 
III.B.3 provides an example of such a situation. 
Finally, and most importantly, the potential outcomes framework 
makes clear that critical choices required to draw causal inferences in 
civil rights litigation are not mathematical.  Instead, they depend on 
decisions about the law and on an understanding of how the world 
works.  These are matters about which judges, lawyers, and laypeople 
can speak as intelligently as those trained in quantitative methods.    
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This Article explains the potential outcomes paradigm for causa-
tion and applies it to civil rights litigation.20  Part I begins with the 
difficulties regression as currently used in civil rights litigation encoun-
ters.  It shows that, at bottom, these problems stem from the fact that 
regression does not begin with any definition of a causal effect, much 
less one that would lead to the near-exclusive focus on coefficients 
characteristic of most modern expert and judicial analysis.  Part II ar-
ticulates and develops the potential outcomes framework for causal in-
ference.  It begins by defining a causal effect in terms of some specific 
changed circumstance (that is, a counterfactual).  It then argues that, 
in most instances, an analyst addressing causal inference questions in 
the context of civil rights litigation should draw inferences using the 
template of a randomized experiment, despite the fact that the data 
available are not randomized but rather observational.  Part III ap-
plies the potential outcomes paradigm to the civil rights litigation set-
ting generally as well as to three particular areas in which causal is-
sues arise: imposition of capital punishment, private employment 
discrimination class actions, and lawsuits alleging vote dilution under 
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  It argues that well-posed questions 
linked to accessible data are available in the first two of these areas, 
but that in the latter no such question is available.  Part IV concludes. 
To illustrate some of the issues discussed, this Article makes fre-
quent reference to a running example of a fictional employer sued for 
salary discrimination under Title VII by a class of female employees.  
Hypothetically, the employer’s computer records include information 
on each employee’s gender, educational achievement (on some scale), 
date of hire (which allows calculation of how long each employee has 
worked at the firm), and current job level (again, on some scale), as 
well as salary.  Simulated data assist in the illustration.21 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  20  There are only a handful of references to the potential outcomes framework in any sort of 
legal setting.  For example, a recent report by a National Academy of Sciences panel on measur-
ing racial discrimination outlined some of the basics.  See PANEL ON METHODS FOR ASSESS-
ING DISCRIMINATION, supra note 17, at 77–89.  Perhaps because it concerned itself with meas-
uring the effects of discrimination generally, however, the panel struggled with the issue of the 
timing of treatment assignment, and it dedicated little attention to litigation.  For other examples, 
see Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War Cases, 
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 65–74 (2005), and Daniel E. Ho, Scholarship Comment, Why Affirmative 
Action Does Not Cause Black Students To Fail the Bar, 114 YALE L.J. 1997 (2005). 
  21  This Article discusses only issues of intentional discrimination — disparate treatment as 
opposed to disparate impact.  In addition, this Article is limited to issues of gender, race, and eth-
nicity; it uses the term “race” as a shorthand for both of the latter two characteristics.    
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I.  REGRESSION’S DIFFICULTIES AND THE  
ABSENCE OF A CAUSAL INFERENCE FRAMEWORK 
This Part briefly summarizes the regression technique as it is typi-
cally used in civil rights disputes,22 then discusses the difficulties it en-
counters as a method for drawing causal inferences in this context.  It 
demonstrates that all difficulties arise from the fact that regression 
does not begin with a coherent framework for causal inference. 
A.  What Is Regression? 
Regression has been explained many times; this section is as brief 
as possible.23  Moreover, this Article will use exactly one techni-
cal/mathematical symbol: β, the universal representation of a regres-
sion coefficient. 
To understand regression, begin with the running example identi-
fied above, and focus on the question of whether salary levels at the 
hypothetical firm reflect gender bias.  In the overwhelming majority of 
employment discrimination cases,24 the analyst would propose the fol-




Salary = β0 + βG*(gender) + βJL*(job level) + βYE*(years educ.) +  
          βYW*(years worked) + error25 
 
One part of the appeal of this model is its simplicity and interpret-
ability.  β0 can be understood as some baseline salary level common to 
all employees.  βG (“G” for gender) is the addition or subtraction in sal-
ary associated with being a woman; by assumption, this amount is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  22  “Regression” here refers to regression as it is most commonly used in civil rights litigation 
and as it is most typically presented in corresponding hornbooks and generic “quantitative meth-
ods for lawyers” volumes.  There are variants to this most common form, such as the “Peters-
Belson” approach illustrated in Figure 3 and accompanying text, infra, that represent improve-
ments.  The point in Part I is that these improvements, while useful if employed as part of a co-
herent framework for defining and estimating causal effects, are insufficient to save regression 
when divorced from such a framework, which is typically the case in modern civil rights   
litigation. 
  23  The references in note 12, supra, include more expansive explanations for lawyers. 
  24  See, e.g., Thomas J. Campbell, Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases: Minimum Standards, 
Comparable Worth, and Other Issues Where Law and Statistics Meet, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 
1312 (1984); Arthur S. Goldberger, Comment, 3 STAT. SCI. 165, 165 (1988). 
  25  Gender is 0 for men, 1 for women.  Note that the “error” here is not a mistake of any kind.  
Instead, it is the difference between what the equation above predicts and what is actually ob-
served; the term “residual” is also commonly used.  Statisticians do not expect predictions from a 
model to be perfect (in fact, they would not know what to do if the predictions were perfect).  The 
idea is that the “error,” the difference between what is predicted and what is observed, is due to 
random variation.    
2008]  CAUSAL INFERENCE  541 
constant for all women.  βJL (“JL” for job level) is the salary amount as-
sociated with each additional unit of job level.  βYE is the amount asso-
ciated with each additional year of education, and βYW the amount as-
sociated with each additional year worked.  The question of interest 
under this model is whether βG is negative and statistically significant, 
meaning negative in a way that is unlikely to be due to chance.  If it is, 
the appealing thing about regression is that βG immediately provides a 
rough measure of how much the defendant firm owes each member of 
the (female) class, because by assumption βG represents the constant 
amount of salary deduction associated with being a woman.26  Most 
introductory statistics books discuss the math used to implement this 
type of regression.  The math can generate what are called “point es-
timates” for the βs, which are single numbers representing some kind 
of best guess for each, and estimated “standard errors” or “standard 
deviations,” which are measures of uncertainty about the point esti-
mates.  Analysts can use these figures to produce, for example, an ap-
proximate interval within which the true βG is likely (in some sense) to 
be found.27 
Some vocabulary: the quantity on the left-hand side of the equation 
(salary, above) is often called the “response” or the “dependent vari-
able,” while the observed quantities on the right-hand side (gender, job 
level, years of education, years worked) are called “explanatory” or 
“independent” variables.  Variables included on the right-hand side of 
a regression equation are said to be “adjusted for” or “controlled for”; 
for example, a litigator might ask an expert witness: “Did your analysis 
control for years of education?”  As mentioned above, the βs are often 
referred to as “effects.”  Note the causal connotation in the phrases 
“dependent variable,” “independent variable,” “explanatory variable,” 
“control for,” “response,” and “effect.”28 
A brief word about implementing this model is necessary.  Any ele-
mentary statistical package or spreadsheet program will produce point 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  26  Even if such a figure may not serve as a basis for an award to each plaintiff, see Int’l Bhd. 
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361, 371–76 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 
424 U.S. 747, 769 (1976), its availability should greatly increase the likelihood of settlement. 
  27  Because this Article focuses on other, more intuitive concepts, it deliberately finesses most 
technical issues, such as the frequentist definition of confidence intervals, normality assumptions 
for small samples, the central limit theorem for large samples, etc.  Note also that the description 
above corresponds to a frequentist framework of statistics; for some causal inference questions, it 
may be advisable to be Bayesian. 
  28  The following statement is typical: “A common method for assessing statistics in employ-
ment discrimination cases is regression analysis, which isolates the impact of certain variables in 
effecting a particular outcome.  Multiple regression analysis .  .  .  is a method of examining the 
effect of particular independent or explanatory variables on a dependent variable.”  CONNOLLY 
ET  AL.,  supra note 12, § 11.03, at 11-4  (footnotes omitted).  In the death penalty context, see 
BALDUS  ET  AL.,  supra note 7, at 164–66 ( 1990) (“After adjusting simultaneously for [certain] 
variables . . . the average race-of-victim effect” was estimated to be a stated quantity.).    
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estimates and standard errors for the βs.  Whenever possible, however, 
a conscientious analyst checks whether a model under consideration 
fits the data, that is, whether the mathematical assumptions necessary 
to implement this model (not discussed here) are reasonable for the 
dataset at issue.  When a diagnostic shows a lack of fit (that is, that 
the mathematical assumptions are unlikely), a conscientious analyst al-
ters the model.29  In regression, the alteration usually consists of add-
ing combinations or different forms of the independent variables to the 
right-hand side of the regression equation, such as two variables mul-
tiplied together or the same variable squared.  Intuitively, these 
changes represent a belief that a one-unit change in an independent 
variable is not associated (even approximately) with a constant change 
in the response. 
To illustrate, in the salary example above: after trying the Simple 
Model and becoming less than satisfied, an analyst might hypothesize 
that the longer people work, the more they get paid, but only up to a 
certain point.  After a certain number of years, salary might tend to 
stabilize, or even decrease.  If so, the analyst might add the variable 
(years worked squared) to the above regression equation,30 producing 
the following, “revised” model: 
 
Revised Model 1: 
 
Salary = β0 + βG*(gender) + βJL*(job level) + βYE*(years educ.) + 
          βYW*(years worked) + βYW2*(years worked squared) + error 
 
One of the maddening aspects of statistics in general, and regres-
sion in particular, is that when one adds a variable in this way, the re-
sults of the revised model may look nothing like those of the simple 
model.  Recall that in the running salary discrimination example, our 
focus is on βG.  It may well happen that in a regression in which each 
variable appears plainly (Simple Model, above), the estimate for βG 
might be positive, statistically significant, and thus favorable (in litiga-
tion terms) to the defendant firm; but if an analyst adds the term 
(years worked squared) to the equation (Revised Model 1, above) the 
estimate for βG is negative, statistically significant, and thus favorable 
(in litigation terms) to a putative female class.  Although the intuition 
behind this phenomenon is not easy to explain in lay terms, one could 
imagine that adding a variable includes a different kind of informa-
tion.  If it is not duplicative of the information already in the model 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  29  For an example, see infra pp. 549–50. 
  30  Adding (years worked squared) to the equation allows the relationship between salary and 
years worked to differ for new versus experienced employees.    
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(from the other variables previously included there), then this new in-
formation could change the overall results a great deal. 
Two observations on model-checking are required, the first a gen-
eral point, the second specific to regression.  First, assessing how well 
any statistical model fits a dataset requires the exercise of judgment.  
Few hard and fast rules are available because whether the model is 
adequate for a dataset depends on — among other things — the ques-
tion being asked, the nature of the lack of fit, and how bad the indica-
tors are.  Some commonly used diagnostics consist of simple graphs, 
with the analyst making a heuristic judgment about whether the shape 
of the plot is in some sense “good enough.”  Second, and more impor-
tantly, when using regression, the analyst cannot examine the fit of the 
model without first implementing that model, that is, directing soft-
ware to produce estimates of the βs that are the quantities of interest 
(particularly βG in the above example).  Thus, an expert witness in a 
salary discrimination case almost unavoidably sees the litigation “an-
swer” a particular regression would produce before she assesses the 
goodness of fit. 
B.  Problems with Regression:  
Bias, Ill-Posed Questions, and Specification Issues 
This section discusses a variety of problems with the regression 
technique as it has been used in the civil rights context during the past 
three decades.  A fundamental theme of this Article is that these diffi-
culties all stem at least in part from a common source, namely, the lack 
of a framework for causal inference.  A “framework for causal infer-
ence” means a structure that compels articulation of a sharp question 
of interest in terms of a causal effect to be measured, links this ques-
tion to a set of quantities that can be reasonably well estimated from 
available data, and provides guidance for the choice of methods to ac-
complish this estimation.  Each of these three elements is essential.  
The first, the insistence on question definition, is the reason why the 
civil rights legal community (in the persons of judges, triers of fact, 
and litigators) consults quantitative analysts on causal questions.  If 
the analysts are to serve their intended purpose, the vague feeling on 
the part of those in the legal business that “the numbers must have 
some information here” must be honed by an insistence on a definition 
of a causal effect and an initial stab at the question to be addressed.  
Otherwise, the conversation between the legal and quantitative com-
munities can result in the latter giving answers to questions the former 
did not really intend to ask.  The second element, how to link this 
question to one or more quantities of interest, permits identification of 
the causal effect that should be the goal of the investigation, the pre-
cise number or set of numbers that is the target of the inference.  With 
this in mind, the analyst can begin to assess whether the available data    
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(taking into particular account how they were collected) contain in-
formation about the desired target.  The third step, guidance on meth-
ods, makes the framework useful. 
The fact that regression as currently employed is not a causal infer-
ence framework has resulted in various problems.  These problems are 
listed in order of their rough importance, where “importance” refers to 
the threat each poses to litigation’s truth-discovery function. 
1.  Bias of the Analyst. — “Bias” is often used in its statistical 
sense, where it has a precise, mathematical definition.  Here, in con-
trast, “bias” means good old-fashioned bias, the human tendency to fa-
vor one side or another more than what an impartial assessment of 
available information would warrant. 
Over twenty years ago, J. Morgan Kousser, after years of experi-
ence testifying in voting rights cases, wrote an article entitled, Are Ex-
pert Witnesses Whores?31  If some of them are, then regression pro-
vides ample opportunity for the fallen to ply their trade.  The problem 
stems from three facts articulated above: first, an analyst fitting a re-
gression sees the litigation answer before she assesses goodness of fit; 
second, deciding whether a model is adequate for the data requires 
judgment; and third, adding or removing variables from a regression 
can result in wholesale changes to the results. 
The ease of stating this difficulty contrasts with the difficulty in 
finding a solution.  Model-checking is typically a multi-stage process: 
the analyst implements a first model, assesses fit, is less than perfectly 
satisfied, implements a second model, assesses fit, compares the fit of 
the first model to that of the second, implements a third, etc.32  A  
model’s fit is never perfect.  At each stage of this process of exploration 
and assessment, the substantive result, the litigation answer, stares the 
analyst in the face.  Only the superhuman can completely disregard 
the temptation to lean towards a result favorable to a chosen side, con-
sciously or no.33 
2.  Ill-Posed Questions. — Given the stranglehold regression cur-
rently enjoys on quantitative proof in civil rights litigation, it is hard to 
shake the belief that one can measure the causal effect of any variable 
by including it on the right-hand side of the equals sign in a regression 
equation.  Such overconfidence is unfortunate.  There are certain mat-
ters about which, at present, we cannot even articulate sharp, answer-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  31  J. Morgan Kousser, Are Expert Witnesses Whores? Reflections on Objectivity in Scholarship 
and Expert Witnessing, PUB. HISTORIAN, Winter 1984, at 5. 
  32  See Daniel E. Ho et al., Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model De-
pendence in Parametric Causal Inference, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 199, 199–200 (2007). 
  33  See Franklin M. Fisher, Statisticians, Econometricians, and Adversary Proceedings, 81 J. 
AM. STAT. ASS’N 277, 285–86 (1986).  See generally Joseph B. Kadane, Ethical Issues in Being an 
Expert Witness, 4 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 21 (2005).    
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able quantitative questions about which available data provide infor-
mation.  Legislators and judges might be able to describe processes, 
including what they suspect to be causal processes, that they would 
like to understand better.  But before statistical techniques can be 
brought to bear, these vagaries must be translated into specific ques-
tions asked in terms of quantities of interest, and these questions must 
be examined to assess whether they are, at the present stage of our 
knowledge of causation and with available data, answerable. 
Little in this translation process depends on an understanding of 
mathematical obscurities, particularly in the civil rights context.  Per-
haps for that reason, regression provides little assistance in the transla-
tion.  One can put virtually anything on the left-hand side of the 
equals sign in a regression equation, place virtually anything else on 
the right-hand side, and obtain a result (including the statistical sig-
nificance of coefficients) from a computer.  But without a well-posed 
question, this result is of no value.  The result is simply a number, or 
more accurately, a range of numbers; what does this range of numbers 
mean?34  Section III.B.3 discusses this issue further in the context of 
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 
3.  Nature of the Model. — The following difficulties with regres-
sion have a common theme; namely, they concern the form of the 
model used, also known as the “specification.”  The issues discussed 
here are often treated mathematically and with technical terms.  That 
is a mistake.  Resolving these issues requires fundamental, and funda-
mentally legal, choices that can and should be understood intuitively.  
To illustrate, this section makes frequent reference to the running   
example of a class action alleging discriminatory pay on the basis of  
gender. 
(a)  Which Variables? — Should analysts include any and all vari-
ables (squares, products of variables, etc.) in regression equations?  If 
not, what principles should guide their choices?  Unfortunately, courts 
cannot simply leave to the experts the task of choosing among vari-
ables.  For example, in salary discrimination cases, courts must often 
decide whether a variable measuring job level or job type should be 
included in the right-hand side of a regression equation.  It may be 
that women (say) are concentrated in lower-level jobs, which pay less.  
Typically, defendants present regressions controlling for job level, that 
is, including it as an independent variable on the right-hand side of the 
equation, while plaintiffs present regressions excluding this variable.  
Plaintiffs argue that the job level measure is tainted in that the defen-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  34  Cf. D OUGLAS  ADAMS, THE  HITCHHIKER’S  GUIDE  TO  THE  GALAXY  179–80 ( 1979) 
(“‘The Answer to the Great Question . . . Of Life, the Universe and Everything . . . Is . . . Forty-
two,’ said Deep Thought . . . .”).    
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dant is assigning women to lower-level (and thus lower-paying) jobs on 
the basis of gender, and thus including job level in a regression “con-
trols away” discrimination.  After disputing the allegations of taint, de-
fendants respond that including job level improves the explanatory 
power (the “fit”) of the model.  The statistical significance of the gen-
der regression coefficient (βG) may depend on whether the job level 
variable is included.  If the job level variable is included, the gender 
coefficient is not significant, while if the job level variable is excluded, 
the gender coefficient is significant.  In other words, the “answer” of 
the study for the purposes of litigation depends on whether the job 
level variable is included.  The question of whether to include job level 
(or other potentially tainted variables, such as performance evaluations 
or disciplinary action)35 can even be case-dispositive, and the situation 
has arisen so often in employment discrimination cases that it has be-
come the subject of its own mini-literature.36 
Meanwhile, courts have struggled.  Some have stumbled upon what 
is part of the right answer, that is, that job level (or another similar 
variable) should be excluded if it is tainted by discrimination.37  But 
they have allocated the burden of proving or disproving taint inconsis-
tently.38  Other courts have focused on a debate between “human capi-
tal” and “establishment-oriented” theories of labor economics, which is 
said to inform this question.39  Further, at least one prominent com-
mentator argues that concededly tainted variables should be included 
in regressions despite the fact that they represent the mechanism for a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  35  See, e.g., Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (approving plaintiffs’ study’s 
decision to disregard “specialized experience” requirement for promotion as too subjective); 
CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 12, app. D at A-89, A-97. 
  36  See, e.g., Srijati Ananda & Kevin Gilmartin, Inclusion of Potentially Tainted Variables in 
Regression Analyses for Employment Discrimination Cases, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 121 (1992); Wal-
ter Fogel, Class Pay Discrimination and Multiple Regression Proofs, 65 NEB. L. REV. 289, 303 
(1986); Ramona L. Paetzold, Multicollinearity and the Use of Regression Analyses in Discrimina-
tion Litigation, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 207 (1992); cf. Finkelstein, supra note 2, at 750–51 (discussing 
a case in which the court applied a regression analysis to determine that scores on a test used to 
screen job applicants were poorly correlated with later job performance). 
  37  E.g., Ottaviani v. State Univ. of N.Y. at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365, 374–75 (2d Cir. 1989); 
Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 479–80 (8th Cir. 1984); Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 566 
F. Supp. 1166, 1180–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev’d and remanded for reconsideration, 797 F.2d 1478 
(2d Cir. 1986); Trout v. Hidalgo, 517 F. Supp. 873, 886 n.47 (D.D.C. 1981); see also PAETZOLD & 
WILLBORN, supra note 12, ch. 6, § 6.13, at 34–35 & nn.3–4 (collecting cases). 
  38  See Ananda & Gilmartin, supra note 36, at 143–46 (collecting cases).  Compare, e.g., Trout, 
517 F. Supp. at 886 n.47 (burden on defendant to prove lack of taint), with Coates v. Johnson & 
Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 544 (7th Cir. 1985) (burden on plaintiffs to prove taint).   
  39  A nice summary for lawyers of these two theories, together with an application of both to 
the tainted variables question, appears in Fogel, supra note 36, at 304–07.  See also Vuyanich v. 
Republic Nat’l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 266 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (discussing human capital 
theory), vacated, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984).    
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defendant firm’s discrimination, if they improve fit and if a specific, 
technical circumstance is present.40 
The job level issue in the employment discrimination context is 
part of a larger debate in the legal community about potentially 
tainted variables, which is itself part of a wider discussion on which 
variables to include on the right-hand side of a regression equation (or 
other statistical model), which in turn is a subset of a broader debate 
on identifying variables for use in a statistical model generally.  An ex-
ample of a dispute at the lowest level of generality occurred recently 
on the subject of whether affirmative action programs at law schools 
cause lower bar passage rates for African American students.  Here, 
the allegedly tainted variable was lower grade point average, the value 
of which is determined after the application of an affirmative action 
program.41 
Stepping back from the question of tainted variables, the question 
of which variables to include on the right-hand side of a regression 
equation is ubiquitous but is especially problematic in the civil rights 
litigation context.  In the vote dilution context, for example, Justice 
Thomas has suggested that regressions used to assess whether voting 
patterns in a jurisdiction are racially polarized should include poten-
tially explanatory variables other than race.42  Theoretically, such 
variables might include party affiliation or educational differences.   
Similarly, returning to the employment context, how should analysts 
treat variables such as gender in a race discrimination case?  On the 
one hand, it is unlawful for an employer to make most employment 
decisions even partially on the basis of gender; on the other hand, gen-
der may be a powerful explanatory variable (even in the absence of sex 
discrimination) for the dependent variable being studied, and a lawsuit 
alleging only race discrimination cannot result in an award of compen-
sation to a class of women. 
Finally, variable selection issues are not limited to the right-hand 
side of a regression equation but extend to the identification of the de-
pendent variable (on the left-hand side, the “response”).  An example 
of the confusion existing in this area is the debate over “reverse regres-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  40  Paetzold, supra note 36, at 227.  The specific technical circumstance is lack of multicollin-
earity.  Speaking non-technically, multicollinearity occurs when two explanatory variables contain 
the same information; an extreme example is including both time in years and time in weeks as 
explanatory variables.  See F RED  L.  RAMSEY  &  DANIEL  W.  SCHAFER, THE  STATISTICAL 
SLEUTH: A COURSE IN METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS 347 (2d ed. 2002).  Multicollinearity can 
cause estimates of regression coefficients to have a great deal of uncertainty in them. 
    As discussed at p. 564, infra, Paetzold is wrong here.  The issue is not multicollinearity but 
statistical bias, particularly post-treatment adjustment bias. 
  41  Compare Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law 
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 442–45 (2004), with Ho, supra note 20, at 2002–03. 
  42  Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 904 & n.13 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).    
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sion” in employment discrimination cases.  Instinctively, most analysts 
take salary, promotion success, hiring success, and similar variables to 
be the response in regression equations, and they put observable quali-
fication measures (for example, years worked, years of education, and 
test scores) on the right-hand side.  But a group of academics has pro-
posed another procedure, namely, considering a qualification measure 
as the response and making salary, for example, an independent vari-
able.43  In other words, one predicts qualifications from salary instead 
of predicting salary from qualifications.  Advocates of reverse regres-
sion argue that before adjudicating a case, courts must choose between 
asking (i) whether the salaries for men and women of equal qualifica-
tions should be the same, or (ii) whether the qualifications of men and 
women of equal salaries should be the same.  And if the focus of 
causal analysis in civil rights litigation is on regression coefficients, re-
verse regression has surface appeal because, depending on the assump-
tions one makes, it might be possible to use either “forward” or “re-
verse” regression to estimate coefficients.  Alas, the choice of whether 
to predict salary from qualifications or qualifications from salary can 
be litigation-dispositive because reverse regression invariably provides 
less “evidence” of discrimination than do more traditional models.44 
(b) Constant Additive Effect, Problems with the Legally “Prohib-
ited” Variable. — In the salary regression equation example above, is it 
reasonable to believe that the effect on salary of being a woman is the 
same for a plaintiff with a high job level, perhaps an upper-level man-
ager, as it is for a plaintiff with a low job level, perhaps a file clerk?  
To clarify, suppose the former’s current salary is $300,000, while the 
latter’s is $15,000, and the regression equation produces an estimated 
βG (found to be statistically significant) of -$1500.00.  Is the -$1500.00 
figure plausible for either plaintiff?  With respect to the upper level 
manager, the figure is so small relative to overall salary that one might 
question whether even a misogynistic firm would bother to discrimi-
nate at this level.  With respect to the file clerk, the figure is so large 
relative to salary that one might question whether a misogynistic but 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  43  See, e.g., Conway & Roberts, supra note 6, at 114–29; Delores A. Conway & Harry V. Rob-
erts, Reverse Regression, Fairness, and Employment Discrimination, 1 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 75, 
78–79 (1983) [hereinafter Conway & Roberts, Reverse Regression]; Arthur S. Goldberger, Com-
ment, in S TATISTICS  AND  THE LAW, supra note 6, at 182, 182 [hereinafter Goldberger, Com-
ment]; Stephan Michelson, Comment, in STATISTICS AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 169, 174–
77.  Reverse regression, unfortunately, refuses to die.  See, e.g., United States v. Delaware, 93 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1248, 1266–69 (D. Del. 2004).  The reference to the reverse regression 
debate is not intended to lend credence to the technique, which suffers from a host of statistical 
problems, only some of which have been explored in the literature thus far.  See, e.g., Arthur S. 
Goldberger, Redirecting Reverse Regression, 2 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 114 (1984); John J. Miller, 
Some Observations, a Suggestion, and Some Comments on the Conway-Roberts Article, 2 J. BUS. 
& ECON. STAT. 123 (1984). 
  44  Goldberger, Comment, supra note 43, at 182.    
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minimally rational firm could hope to avoid detection of discrimina-
tion.  Yet the assumption of the Simple Model above is that the effect 
on salary of being a woman is the same for both the manager and  
the file clerk, that is, that the effect at issue is constant across all   
individuals. 
So what?  The problem is that this assumption of a constant, addi-
tive effect for all women can mask discrimination when it is present 
and can give a false impression of discrimination when none exists.  
For an example of how the former might occur, imagine a sexist but 
somewhat economically rational firm assigning salaries to men and 
women occupying similar positions.  Some women are so productive 
that the firm, despite its sexism, wants to retain their services, so it 
provides salaries equal to those of similarly qualified men (that is, the 
effect here is $0).  Some men are so unproductive that the firm wants 
t o  e a s e  t h e m  o u t ,  s o  i t  p r o v i d e s  salaries designed to induce them to 
look for other jobs; it also, of course, does the same to unproductive 
women (that is, the effect here is also $0).  In the medium range of 
productivity, however, the firm feels able to express its sexist nature, 
providing salaries to members of both genders designed to keep most 
of them working but still paying women less than equally productive 
men (that is, the effect is $X).  In such a situation, the simple regres-
sion model with a constant additive effect will produce one estimate of 
the effect on salary of being a woman, a single number for all women, 
that constitutes a complicated kind of average of (a) the $0 for the 
highly productive, (b) the $X for those of middling productivity, and 
(c) the $0 for the unproductive.  Recalling that there is some uncer-
tainty in all statistical estimation, the averaging of the $0, $X, and $0 
amounts might well be statistically indistinguishable from an overall 
$0 differential (that is, not statistically significant).45 
From the point of view of an economist attempting to understand 
how a firm functions, as opposed to an expert witness attempting to 
produce an analysis understandable and useful to judges and juries, 
relaxing this constancy assumption is easy.  Returning to the running 
salary discrimination example, and recalling the Simple Model, above, 
one potential fix is to create a new variable by multiplying gender and 
job level together; the resulting model is still readable. 
 
Revised Model 2: 
 
Salary = β0 + βG*(gender) + βJL*(job level) + βYE*(years educ.) 
          + βYW*(years worked) + βGJL*(gender)*(job level) + error 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  45  See infra note 50 and accompanying text.    
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The new variable is the (gender)*(job level) term (and the subscript 
“GJL” stands for gender-job-level).  Because of it, the effect on salary 
associated with being female now depends on job level.  For a 
woman46 at job level 1 (whatever that means), the effect is βG*1 + 
βGJL*1, while for a woman at job level 2, the effect is βG*1 + βGJL*2. 
In terms of usefulness in a discrimination case, however, the model 
has grown complicated.  In the original model, we could pose a single, 
simple question: is the estimate for βG, the only coefficient associated 
with gender, negative (and statistically significant)?  In the revised 
model, we now have two coefficients associated with gender, βG and 
βGJL; upon which should the analysis focus?  What if one is statistically 
significant and the other is not?  What if one is negative (and thus fa-
vorable to the litigation proof of a female class) while the other is posi-
tive (and thus adverse to such proof)?47  Notice that the problem 
grows as we add more gender-specific terms to the regression, such as 
the multiplication of gender and years worked, gender and years of 
education, etc. 
Experimental, experiential, and judicial evidence all suggest that 
the problems articulated above are, unfortunately, not hypothetical.   
An example of experimental evidence is a recently published paper in 
which two authors studied the callback rate for (fictitious) resumes 
randomized to have either African American–sounding (such as Laki-
sha) or Caucasian-sounding (such as Emily) names.48  The two authors 
found that an African American–sounding name lowered the callback 
rate, but they also found that the size of the negative effect varied ac-
cording to whether the fictional resume was “high” or “low” quality.49  
In other words, the name-race effect was not constant.  On the experi-
ential front, a pioneering expert witness in employment discrimination 
cases has written, “The simple regression model assuming a constant 
shift [β] is unrealistic. . . . Virtually all highly (low) qualified employees 
will (not) be promoted.  It is in the middle range of qualification levels 
that discrimination is most likely to appear.”50  For evidence of confu-
sion in the judiciary, see Penk v. Oregon State Board of Higher Educa-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  46  Recall that the gender variable was 1 for women and 0 for men. 
  47  See Conway & Roberts, Reverse Regression, supra note 43, at 78 (“If [interaction effects] are 
not slight, the problems of interpretation become severe not only for statisticians but for judges.  
Pronounced interaction effects could lead to data patterns in which any concept of simple dis-
crimination or unfairness against females [or] minorities is lost.”). 
  48  Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than 
Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 
991 (2004). 
  49  Id. at 992 (“[H]aving a higher-quality resume has a smaller [positive] effect [on callback rate] 
for African-Americans.”); id. at 1000–01 (“Most strikingly, African-Americans experience much 
less of an increase in callback rate for similar improvements in their credentials.”). 
  50  Joseph L. Gastwirth, Comment, 3 STAT. SCI. 175, 176 (1988).    
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tion,51 where a court downgraded the evidentiary weight of the plain-
tiffs’ regression coefficients because of the inclusion of a variable 
analogous to (gender)*(job level) in the example.52 
(c)  Problems with Variables Other than the Legally “Prohibited” 
Variable. — The previous section focused on the difficulties that arise 
when the effect associated with gender is not the same at all job levels.  
But this problem might also arise with other variables as well; for ex-
ample, the effect associated with an additional year of education might 
not be the same at all job levels.  Or, as outlined above in the discus-
sion of model fitting, it may be that salary tends to increase with years 
worked only up to a point, and that after that point, additional years 
worked are associated with a lower salary. 
One might think that if we are focused on the effect associated 
with gender, problems with the other variables would matter less.   
Alas, such is not the case.  To see why, return to the salary discrimina-
tion running example, and consider Figure 1, which plots the salaries 
of 100 employees (50 male, 50 female) on the Y-axis against the years 
worked on the X-axis.  Because salary is on the Y-axis, higher is 
“good” in the sense of more money.  It appears that men, represented 
by the black squares, do better than women, represented by the grey 
diamonds, for any reasonable range of years worked.  Take, for exam-
ple, the period from five to ten years worked, as marked by the two 
vertical, dotted lines.  In this range, most of the squares are above 
most of the diamonds, meaning men tend to have higher salaries than 


















  51  48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1724 (D. Or. 1985). 
  52  Id. at 1849–51.    


































FIGURE 1.  MALE AND FEMALE SALARIES  

















Salaries Versus Years Worked, Male and Female, for a Hypothetical Firm 
(Simulated Data): At any given level of Years Worked, it appears that men 
generally have higher salaries than women.  But in a simple regression 
approach, represented by the two parallel lines, the line for women is 
above the line for men, suggesting discrimination against men!  Under this 
framework, the amount of “damages” for each man equals the (constant) 
distance between the two lines.  The explanation for the simple regression 
model’s incorrect result is (i) a curve in the data (at least for men) that is 
not reflected in the regression equation, and (ii) the fact that men have a 
wider range of years worked than women. 
 
What is the problem?  The problem is that if analysts use the typi-
cal model in such cases, they would conclude that there is statistically 
significant salary discrimination in favor of women, that is, that men 
should be suing the firm.  In other words, this is another instance in 
which the usual regression gives the wrong answer.  The “usual regres-
sion” here means the following, reduced version of the Simple Model, 
above: 
 
Salary = β0 + βG*(gender) + βYW*(years worked) + error 
 
Geometrically, this model corresponds to two parallel lines, one for 
men, the other for women.  The lines are the “best fitting”; stated 
loosely, they are the lines that stay as close to as many points as possi-
ble.  Both lines appear in Figure 1, above, and there, one can see that 
the dotted line for women is above the solid line for men.  Up means 
higher salary, so the fact that the female line is above the male line    
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means that the regression model “thinks” that, given years worked, 
women are earning more than men.  How did that happen?  Notice 
that at the far left and far right parts of Figure 1, there are a fair 
number of squares but no diamonds.  Notice also that most of these 
squares at the far left and right are below the points in the middle of 
the graph.  The male line has to account for those lower-salaried men 
near the edges of the graph.  In other words, the lower-earning men at 
the right- and left-hand portions of the plot “pull” the male line down.  
But there are few if any women who have worked fewer than five or 
more than fifteen years,53 so there is nothing to “pull” the female line 
down (assuming, which one should not, that female salaries would fall 
off in a pattern similar to the men).  In the big picture, the analyst has 
tried to fit a single, straight line to all the male data, when the male 
pattern is in fact curved.  That resulted in the wrong answer for the 
question of interest, which was whether the firm discriminates against 
women (and, incidentally, a statistically significant wrong answer). 
Again, one might ask, what is the problem?  If analysts can see this 
sort of thing in a graph, they will adjust the model.  There are two re-
sponses.  The first is that when analysts try to include additional vari-
ables such as years of education and job level, they can no longer plot 
all variables on a flat piece of paper, or even on a hologram.  Unfortu-
nately, the world we live in has only three spatial dimensions, not 
enough to visualize non-trivial data.  In many (perhaps most) cases of 
interest, then, an analyst would not be able to see this problem.  The 
second issue is that even with only one variable (as in the example 
above), this problem can be difficult to see.  The upside-down U-curve 
in the above graph was constructed to make the problem obvious, but 
it will not ordinarily be so clear.54 
Finally, notice that in Figure 1 matters might not have gone amiss 
if the analyst had confined herself to the range of years worked for 
which there existed an appropriate number of both male and female 
observations, say between five and fourteen years.  Part II returns to 
this thought. 
(d)  Differing Variable Types. — In the running gender example 
used thus far, the variable on the left-hand side of the regression equa-
tion is salary.  Suppose salary takes on values from, say, $15,000 to 
$300,000.  Statistically, regression depends on the assumption that sal-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  53  There are several reasons, some gender-neutral and some not, why men and women might 
have different patterns of a variable such as years worked.  For example, a years-worked meas-
urement might reflect maternity leave time.  Educational achievement patterns might reflect early 
childhood socialization that steered women away from certain degrees or fields. 
  54  It is likely that this problem infects employment data, as it does data from so many other 
fields.  See Kevin M. Murphy & Finis Welch, Empirical Age-Earnings Profiles, 8 J. LAB. ECON. 
202 (1990).    
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ary can be any value at all, but both negative values and unreasonably 
high figures have such low probability that analysts typically do not 
bother with this annoyance.  Sometimes, however, analysts must deal 
with variables where the annoyance cannot be ignored.  For example, 
suppose that instead of salary, we want to analyze for gender bias a set 
of promotions recently awarded by a firm.  Here, the variable of pro-
motion success may be only two values, 0 (failure) and 1 (success).   
Treating a 0–1 variable as though it could take on any value at all of-
ten goes badly. 
Again, the problem is not a shortage of statistical techniques; the 
terms “logistic regression” or “probit regression” may be familiar.  Both 
are methods that focus on the probability that an applicant receives a 
promotion, and they often work well for 0-1 response variables.  These 
models may be conceptualized as follows. 
 
  Promotion probability = Fancy Math(β0 + βG*(gender) + βJL*(job  
                 level) + βYE*(years educ.) + βYW*(years  
                                         work)) 
 
One can again ask the question of whether βG is non-zero and statisti-
cally significant.  Luckily, for many models of this type, it is still the 
case that a negative estimate for βG is good for the female plaintiffs’ 
lawsuit.  But the fancy math55 involved in the above model is a sub-
stantial drawback in terms of both intuitive understanding of the 
model and its usefulness in litigation; βG is no longer the salary addi-
tion or subtraction associated with being a woman, as it was with the 
Simple Model, so there is no intuitively obvious measure of the rele-
vant effect.  In logistic regression, for example, βG would represent the 
logarithm of an odds ratio, not an intuitive concept.  Courts and com-
mentators have disparaged or even rejected alternative models of dis-
crimination for precisely these reasons.56 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  55  See RAMSEY & SCHAFER, supra note 40, at 580–637, for an accessible explanation of the 
principles involved in logistic and probit regression. 
  56  See, e.g., Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 476 n.14 (8th Cir. 1984); Penk, 48 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1860 (“Because the regression analysis is a logistic regression 
analysis, the sex coefficients in [an expert report] represent the logarithm of the ratio of the odds 
of a man being in the higher group to the odds of a woman being in the higher group after all 
qualifications represented as variables in the equation are accounted for.  These sex coefficients 
are not readily understandable, and plaintiffs did not make them any more so in their rebuttal 
report.” (citations omitted)); BALDUS ET AL., supra note 7, at 70 n.34 (“The key measure[] of the 
impact of a given variable [is] the logistic-regression coefficient, which is difficult to interpret in 
its own right . . . .”); Campbell, supra note 24, at 1313 n.43 (An alternative technique “would not 
directly yield dollar estimates of different treatment, however, so continued use of regression mod-
els is preferable.”).  As before, this particular issue can be solved, even within the regression con-
text, if one is willing to abandon a focus on regression coefficients.  See, e.g., Joseph L. Gastwirth 
& Samuel W. Greenhouse, Biostatistical Concepts and Methods in the Legal Setting, 14 S TAT. 
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4.  One Regression, or Two? — In an effort to address some of the 
issues identified in the previous sections, some expert witnesses and 
commentators have proposed running separate regressions, one for 
members of the plaintiff class and one for those outside the protected 
group.  The idea, which is absolutely correct, is that a single regression 
with a constant additive treatment effect is a blunt instrument, a 
model ordinarily too clumsy to capture the nuances of the data, and 
that running separate regressions for protected and unprotected groups 
allows for greater flexibility.57  Continuing with the example of a gen-
der discrimination lawsuit focusing on salary, an analyst might state 
the following two equations: 
 
SalaryW = βW0 + βWJL*(job level) + βWYE*(years educ.) + βWYW*(years  
               work) + errorW 
 
SalaryM = βM0 + βMJL*(job level) + βMYE*(years educ.) + βMYW*(years  
               work) + errorM 
 
The symbols W and M refer, of course, to women and men; note that 
there is no βG*(gender) term in either equation because, for each equa-
tion, there is only one gender. 
An analyst following the two-regression approach divides the data 
into a male dataset and a female dataset, then uses the now-standard 
regression techniques twice, once for each dataset.  Now what?  For an 
analyst in a quantitative culture such as ours that fixates on regression 
coefficients, one initial instinct is to compare the coefficients from the 
two regressions.  Suppose the analyst finds that the estimate for βWYE, 
which corresponds to the amount associated with a one-year increase 
in education level among women, is lower than the estimated βMYE, 
which corresponds to the amount associated with a one-year increase 
in education level for men.  Assuming this difference is statistically 
significant,58 the analyst might consider it evidence that the defendant 
firm is valuing years of education less for women than for men, which 
might support an inference of gender discrimination. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
MED.  1641,  1646–51 ( 1995).  But the fact that the players in civil rights litigation have not 
adopted such solutions suggests something about the way that regression, when used without ref-
erence to a causal inference framework, leads to an unhealthy focus on coefficients. 
  57  See, e.g., Ottaviani v. State Univ. of N.Y. at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 1989); 
PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 12, ch. 6, § 6.10. 
  58  I have not personally run across a proposal to test for significance in this setting, but con-
structing one does not seem too difficult.  One could, for example, examine the posterior distribu-
tions of the two coefficients after fitting the regression models with Bayesian techniques.  See, e.g., 
ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., BAYESIAN DATA ANALYSIS 353–85 (2d. ed. 2004).    
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As courts and commentators have recognized,59 however, the prob-
lem with this focus on regression coefficients is that it often yields con-
tradictory results.  Suppose the analyst finds that βWYE is significantly 
lower than βMYE, but simultaneously finds that the estimate for βWYW is 
significantly higher than βMYW.  In other words, it appears that the firm 
values additional years of education for men greater than for women, 
but simultaneously values additional years worked for women greater 
than for men.  Perhaps both men and women should sue the firm.  
There are methods to address this issue even wholly within the regres-
sion context,60 but they require the abandonment of a focus on regres-
sion coefficients. 
C.  The Fundamental Problem: Absence of a Causal Framework 
In the gender discrimination context, should experts, litigators, ju-
ries, and judges care whether a defendant firm pays men more than 
equally qualified women, or whether men are less qualified than 
equally salaried women, as the debate over reverse regression might 
suggest?  Should the court be forced to pick between human capital 
and establishment-oriented theories of labor economics, as the debate 
over including a job level variable in a regression might suggest?  The 
first inquiry is bizarre because it seems as though a defendant is liable 
in either case, while the second seems removed from the legal task of 
assessing whether discrimination is present.  In the voting rights con-
text, should courts, in attempting some sort of causal inquiry, focus on 
the races of candidates, the races of voters, or both?  What sort of evi-
dence from statistical models, regression or otherwise, would convince 
courts that something causally connected to race is driving voting   
patterns? 
Few would doubt that litigation often turns on the esoterica of spe-
cialized fields, and when legal questions depend on exploring the un-
familiar, courtroom actors learn what they must.  An oft-cited danger 
in such situations is that generalist judges and lay juries will fail to 
understand what they see and hear, even with material presented by 
able litigators and articulate, chaste experts.  But in my view, an un-
derappreciated danger in such contexts is that of undue immersion 
such that legal arbiters or triers of fact lose track of what it is that they 
need to decide, of the questions they need to answer. 
In the civil rights context, when experts analyze data containing in-
formation about repetitive events, such as imposition of capital pun-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  59  See, e.g., Vuyanich v. Republic Nat’l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224,  278 (N.D. Tex. 
1980), vacated, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984); PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 12, ch. 6, 
§ 6.10, at 27–28 & n.7. 
  60  See infra note 83 and accompanying text.    
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ishment, employment decisions, and elections, what’s the question?   
The discussion above has demonstrated that, all too often, the quanti-
tative question has been the significance of regression coefficients 
(usually a single regression coefficient).  Is that the right question?   
The argument in favor of coefficients is that they capture a particular 
kind of conditional association, and that a legal decisionmaker can, 
perhaps in conjunction with other evidence, use the existence of the 
association to support an inference of causation.  But the previous sec-
tions have demonstrated that this alone will not suffice because regres-
sion is a mathematical and statistical technique, not a causal inference 
framework.  The ill-posed questions discussed in section I.B.2 demon-
strate that this technique is insufficiently rich to allow (or insist on) 
definition of a causal effect and articulation of a sharp causal question 
of interest.  The modeling issues that arise, discussed in sections I.B.3 
and I.B.4, suggest problems regarding the linking of the causal ques-
tion to a quantity that becomes the target of estimation.  And regres-
sion’s lack of guidance on the choices one must make during imple-
mentation raises the possibility that bias of the analyst, discussed in 
section I.B.1, will overwhelm any information the data contain. 
The result is that while regression might capture a particular kind 
of conditional association, without a theory to specify whether a par-
ticular association is legally relevant, analysts lack a principled basis to 
decide something as fundamental as the “outcome of interest,” much 
less the comparatively mundane matters of what variables to include 
in a regression, in what form, and whether to use one regression or 
two.  We should tolerate this situation only if we must.  In other 
words, we should continue using regression in the way that we have 
used it thus far only if we cannot come up with something better. 
II.  POTENTIAL OUTCOMES:  
DEFINING CAUSAL EFFECTS AND BEYOND 
This Part articulates the potential outcomes understanding of 
causal inference, a general framework that defines a causal effect and 
provides guidance on how to use data to draw inferences about the ef-
fects associated with an identified cause.61  A thumbnail sketch of the 
framework is as follows.  An analyst begins by identifying “units” that 
can be subjected to different “treatments” and by picking an “outcome” 
variable.  It may help to think of hospital patients taking a pill or not 
taking a pill when the hospital is measuring blood pressure levels.  A 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  61  For technical primers on potential outcomes, see Guido W. Imbens & Donald B. Rubin, 
Rubin Causal Model,  in N EW  PALGRAVE  DICTIONARY  OF  ECONOMICS  255–60 (Steven N. 
Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008); and Paul W. Holland, Rejoinder, 81 J. AM. 
STAT. ASS’N 968 (1986), in addition to the sources cited supra note 17.    
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causal effect is defined as a comparison between (i) the value a par-
ticular unit would have for the outcome variable after the application 
of a treatment at a given time, and (ii) the value that same unit would 
have for the same outcome variable after application of some alterna-
tive treatment at that same given time.  Unfortunately, for any single 
unit (call it “Unit A”), an analyst can only apply one treatment at a 
given time, so only the outcome associated with the treatment actually 
received can be observed.  Thus, the analyst must search for a way to 
fill in Unit A’s missing (counterfactual) outcome value, the one corre-
sponding to the alternative treatment.  One way to accomplish this 
task is to find a unit (call it “Unit B”) that received the alternative 
treatment; Unit B can donate its value as Unit A’s missing counterfac-
tual outcome.  For such a donation to make sense, Unit A and Unit B 
must be similar to one another; if they are dissimilar, any difference in 
their potential outcome values could be due to dissimilarity rather than 
the differing treatments to which they were exposed.  The best way to 
assure similarity over a set of units is via a randomized experiment be-
cause randomization assures that all variables other than the treatment 
are statistically similar; thus, in causal inference, a randomized ex-
periment is the gold standard.  In the civil rights context, a random-
ized experiment is impossible, so analysts should use observational 
data to recreate the circumstances of a randomized experiment to the 
extent possible.  At bottom, this process of recreating a randomized 
experiment typically involves searching for units that are similar to 
one another in all observable ways (as measured before treatment, not 
after) except treatment and ignoring the data from units that have no 
counterparts. 
A.  Primitive Concepts:  
Treatment, Units, and the Fundamental Problem 
A potential outcomes understanding of causation begins with iden-
tification of four fundamental concepts: units, a treatment, the timing 
of treatment assignment, and an outcome of interest.  The units are the 
things upon which a treatment operates.  The nature of the causal in-
quiry is to discern how the treatment affects the value of a specified 
outcome.  Assume for the moment that there are precisely two forms of 
treatment, denoted “M” and “F” (for perceived male and perceived fe-
male).62  There are then two potential outcomes for a single unit: one 
would occur if the unit receives treatment M at a particular moment, 
while the other would occur if the unit receives treatment F at the 
same moment.  The causal effect for a single unit involves some com-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  62  See infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of “perceived” as 
opposed to “actual” gender here.    
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parison of the value of the outcome under treatment M to the value of 
the outcome under treatment F; one typical comparison is the differ-
ence between the two quantities (that is, one minus the other).  The 
role of time in these definitions is critical.  The analyst must specify 
the timing of treatment assignment.  The very concept of a “treatment” 
refers to something applied at a particular time. 
For a single unit called “Unit 1” that receives treatment M, the con-
cepts in these definitions can be represented effectively in the following 
chart, which also introduces some abbreviations (“xx” if something is 
observed, “??” if something is not observed).  The chart will grow hori-
zontally and vertically as additional concepts are defined. 
 
TABLE 1.  CAUSAL INFERENCE TABLE FOR A SINGLE UNIT,  
ASSUMING EXACTLY ONE FORM OF TREATMENT 
Unit #  Treatment  Outcome (if treatment 
M received) 
Outcome (if treatment F 
received) 
1  M  some observed value = xx  missing/unobserved = ?? 
 
Again, the causal effect of the treatment on Unit 1 is some kind of 
comparison between the outcome under treatment M and the outcome 
under treatment F (at the same moment in time), often Outcome(M) 
subtracted from Outcome(F).  Immediately, what has been called the 
“fundamental problem of causal inference”63 becomes evident: it is not 
possible to observe directly the causal effect for any single unit.  Even 
in the simplest possible case — a single unit and a treatment that can 
take on only two values64 — one of the potential outcomes is missing.  
Assumptions and more information are needed for quantitative tech-
niques to become relevant. 
To make these concepts more concrete, return to the running ex-
ample of a salary discrimination case focusing on gender and define 
the treatment as being perceived as male, “M,” versus being perceived 
as female, “F,” at the same moment in time.65  Then Table 1, above, 
for a unit assigned treatment F looks like the following. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  63  Holland, supra note 17, at 947. 
  64  If the treatment could take on, say, four values, the chart would have a potential outcome 
column for each treatment value (and thus four potential outcome columns). 
  65  A critical assumption here (stated somewhat simplistically) is that there is only one form of 
“M” and one form of “F.”  This assumption would be violated if, for example, it were nonsensical 
to speak about a unit’s being perceived as male without discussing how “manly” the unit is.  In 
that case, the analyst would need to divide Table 2’s “Salary(M)” column into separate columns 
labeled, say, “Salary(Very Manly)” and “Salary(Moderately Manly).” 
   The assumption that there is only one form of each treatment, together with the require-
ment of replication across different units, may be seen as the potential outcomes framework’s de-
fense against the theoretical and philosophical attack that all forms of counterfactual reasoning 
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TABLE 2.  CAUSAL INFERENCE TABLE FOR A SINGLE UNIT,  
SALARY DISCRIMINATION, GENDER 
Unit #  Treatment  Salary(F)  Salary(M) 
1  F  some observed value = “xx”  missing/unobserved = ?? 
 
At this point, those with minimal training in tort law may feel like 
they are in familiar territory.  Tables 1 and 2 can be thought of as rep-
resentations of but-for causation, the most basic causation concept in 
law.66  Individual tort cases typically involve a comparison of what ac-
tually did occur with what would have occurred had some specific act 
or omission not taken place.  In such a case, one can think of the 
treatment as either the act or omission or the absence of the act or 
omission.  The trier of fact in individual cases uses the evidence pre-
sented at trial and its own understanding of how the world works to 
fill in the missing potential outcome and, subject to other relevant le-
gal principles, decides the case accordingly.  The critical concept im-
plicit in but-for causation as applied in ordinary tort cases, but often 
lost in the civil rights context, is time.67  In tort cases, the focus on a 
particular act or omission typically makes it easy to identify a specific 
time at which the treatment (the allegedly tortious act or omission) oc-
curred.  In the salary discrimination example in Table 2, however, the 
problem can be more difficult, as discussed below. 
B.  Additional Units and the Non-Interference Assumption 
As noted above, the fundamental problem of causal inference is 
that for any individual unit at least one of the potential outcomes is 
missing, and this problem makes additional information and assump-
tions necessary before statistical techniques become useful.  Ordinarily, 
the additional information comes in the form of observations of other 
units, and an oft-made assumption is that the units do not interfere 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
are impossibly non-specific and inherently value-laden.  See, e.g., Robert N. Strassfeld, If . . . : 
Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 339 (1992) (supporting the use of counterfac-
tuals); see also H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985).  In the 
potential outcomes framework, we imagine each unit’s situation to be exactly as it was except for 
a single, sharply defined change as of a particular moment in time.  Replication assures that puz-
zles posed by, for example, an unusual novus actus interveniens (superseding event), see HART & 
HONORÉ, supra, at xlv, should not affect overall estimates because such bizarre chains of events 
typically do not happen repeatedly. 
  66  See Strassfeld, supra note 65, at 345–46. 
  67  See Gastwirth, supra note 50, at 176 (“The failure of some courts to realize the importance 
of time and the need for exchangeability, in my opinion, has led to far more ‘legal mischief’ than 
some of the technical issues concerning regression analysis that have dominated the statistical lit-
erature.” (citations omitted)).    
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with one another.68  In other words, with a set of multiple observa-
tions, the potential outcomes for one unit do not depend on the treat-
ment a different unit receives.69  If so, then an expanded version of 
Table  2, above, for a dataset with three units receiving treatment F 
(perceived as female) and five receiving treatment M (perceived as 
male) appears below.70 
 
TABLE 3.  CAUSAL INFERENCE TABLE FOR MULTIPLE UNITS,  
SALARY DISCRIMINATION, GENDER, ASSUMING NON-
INTERFERENCE AND EXACTLY ONE FORM OF TREATMENT 
Unit #  Treatment  Salary(M)  Salary(F) 
1 F  ??  91,200 
2 F  ??  92,400 
3 F  ??  94,100 
4 M  47,100  ?? 
5 M  98,900  ?? 
6 M  97,700  ?? 
7 M  95,300  ?? 
8 M  81,300  ?? 
 
Again, notice that half of the information we would like to have is 
missing.  Specifically, what is missing is the counterfactual for each 
unit, that is, the outcome under the treatment that was not applied to 
that unit.  To proceed, there must be some way to fill in all of the miss-
ing values from Table 3. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  68  If the units do interfere with each other, then the treatment applied to one unit might affect 
the other’s potential outcomes.  For example, if a firm is applying a hard gender quota to hiring 
decisions, the fact that Unit 1, a person who in fact received treatment perceived male, is hired 
may decrease the probability that Unit 2, who also in fact received treatment perceived male, is 
hired.  Thus, we need to know the treatment both units received in order to define the potential 
outcomes of either.  Pictorially, the chart for two units, where both in fact received treatment per-
ceived male (T = M), but where either could have received the alternative treatment perceived 
female (T = F), and where O stands for “outcome” (here, whether the unit is hired), would be as 
follows. 
Unit #  Treatment  O(T1=M, T2=M) O(T1=M, T2=F) O(T1=F, T2=M) O(T1=F, T2=F) 
1 M  xx  ??  ??  ?? 
2 M  xx  ??  ??  ?? 
 
  69  In some situations, this non-interference assumption is hard to recognize and assess.  For 
example, if one attempts to draw causal inferences about judicial behavior from appellate deci-
sions, and in doing so one treats cases as units, then the non-interference assumption means that 
precedent has no relevance or force in judicial decisionmaking.  See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 
20, at 65–69.  Litigators might find such an assumption unsettling. 
  70  These values, as well as those in subsequent tables in this section, come from some of the 
artificial data graphed in Figure 1.    
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C.  Donating Values: Filling in the Missing Counterfactuals 
With the problem defined in this manner, one instinctive way to fill 
in Unit 1’s missing salary under treatment M is to substitute an ob-
served value from a unit that actually did receive treatment M, that is, 
an observed salary from Units 4–8.  Lacking a better idea, the analyst 
might choose among Units 4–8 at random with equal probability (1/5) 
and “impute” the chosen unit’s salary as Unit 1’s salary under treat-
ment M (then do the same for Units 2–3).  For Units 4–8, the analyst 
does the opposite, that is, picks a unit from 1–3 with probability 1/3 
and imputes the corresponding salary.  In essence, observations “do-
nate” observed outcomes to one another to fill in each unit’s missing 
potential outcomes; one can also refer to “imputation” of potential out-
comes.  An example of one iteration of this procedure produces the fol-
lowing table, with imputed values in bold italic type. 
 
TABLE 4.  CAUSAL INFERENCE TABLE FOR MULTIPLE  
UNITS, SALARY DISCRIMINATION, GENDER, VALUES  
IMPUTED FOR MISSING POTENTIAL OUTCOMES 
Unit #  Treatment  Salary(M)  Salary(F) 
1 F  81,300  91,200 
2 F  47,100  92,400 
3 F  95,300  94,100 
4 M  47,100  91,200 
5 M  98,900  94,100 
6 M  97,700  91,200 
7 M  95,300  92,400 
8 M  81,300  94,100 
 
With the missing potential outcomes filled in, calculating any quan-
tity of interest is straightforward.  For example, to estimate the aver-
age difference in salary caused by the perceived gender treatment, an 
analyst can calculate the average in the Salary(F) column minus the 
average in the Salary(M) column.71 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  71  There are various ways to generate uncertainty measures.  For example, an analyst can re-
peat this (random) imputation procedure a great many times, calculating the average of the Sal-
ary(F) column minus the average of the Salary(M) column each time, to obtain a distribution of 
the possible values of average Salary(F) minus the average Salary(M). 
   The idea of donating values to fill in missing potential outcomes is the instinct behind so-
called “audit studies” popularized in the law, primarily in the fair housing context.  An unfortu-
nate fact of life is that the researcher can only randomize which of a pair of testers visits a vendor, 
or perhaps the order in which two testers visit the vendor, as opposed to randomizing a single 
tester’s race or gender.  That fact of life is the source of the instinct to make the testers resemble 
each other in as many ways as possible except for race or gender. 
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D.  Randomization: Balance in Background Variables 
From the description above, it should be clear this procedure will 
produce misleading results without another critical assumption: the 
units perceived male cannot be systematically different from the units 
perceived female in some relevant way the analyst does not observe.72  
If, for example, Units 1 and 8 differ in a salary-relevant way other 
than the treatment given to each, then this business of using Unit 8’s 
observed salary for what Unit 1’s salary would have been had Unit 1 
been perceived male is a bad idea.  Any causal effect that an analyst 
attributes to the treatment might really be due instead to the other dif-
ference between Units 1 and 8. 
The best way to assure73 that the units assigned M are not system-
atically different from the units assigned F is to assign the treatment 
(M or F) randomly.  This is what makes random assignment such a 
powerful procedure in causal inference.  Random assignment assures 
that, in the absence of bad luck, units who receive one treatment   
are not systematically different from those who receive the other   
treatment. 
More specifically, randomization assures that, with an important 
set of exceptions discussed immediately below, any variable that might 
affect the potential outcomes will look approximately the same for the 
group assigned treatment M as it does for the group assigned treat-
ment F.  Here, “look approximately the same” means that the distribu-
tion of the variable will be the same in the M and the F groups, that 
is, the same among men and women.  In the salary discrimination 
running example, if it were possible (see below) to randomize the per-
ceived gender treatment, the randomization would assure that the pat-
tern of years of education values for men would look roughly the same 
as the pattern of years of education values for women.  Because of this 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
   The literature reporting the results of, assessing, and criticizing audit studies is vast.  For 
overviews and summaries, see, for example, A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DISCRIMINATION 
IN  AMERICA:  THE  ROLE  OF  TESTING  (Michael Fix & Margery Austin Turner eds., 1998); 
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 
(Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993); and HARRY CROSS ET AL., URBAN INST., EM-
PLOYER HIRING PRACTICES: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF HISPANIC AND ANGLO JOB 
SEEKERS (1990).  For criticisms, see, for example, Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 48, at 
993–94; and James J. Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 101, 
104–11. 
  72  In more precise terms, the assumption is that the potential outcome vectors (the two salaries 
for each unit in the example above) for the persons perceived as male (treatment M) are not sys-
tematically different from the potential outcome vectors for the persons perceived as female 
(treatment F). 
  73  Technically, “assure” is too strong.  When there is a sufficient number of units, random as-
signment makes systematic differences between treated and control units unlikely in a way ana-
lysts can quantify and handle.    
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similarity, something quantitative analysts call “balance,”74 it is 
unlikely that any systematic difference in salary between men and 
women is due to disparate lengths of time in school.  Note that this 
balance would occur even if no one measured the years of education 
variable.  That, again, is the power of randomization; it even balances 
variables that analysts do not see. 
The previous paragraph explained that randomization balances 
variables that might have a role in determining the potential outcomes, 
subject to an important set of exceptions: those variables that are 
themselves affected by the treatment.  This is as it should be, as ana-
lysts do not ordinarily want balance in variables affected by treat-
ment.75  An example (standard in the quantitative literature) demon-
strates why: Suppose an analyst is assessing the effect of smoking on 
death, and suppose it were possible to randomize some people to 
smoke and some to avoid smoking.  Would the analyst expect ran-
domization to assure that the percentage of people who contract lung 
cancer be similar among smokers and non-smokers?  The answer is 
“No,” if incidence of lung cancer is itself affected by the treatment re-
ceived (smoking or non-smoking).  Nor should the analyst desire bal-
ance on this variable, particularly if lung cancer is a means by which 
smoking (the treatment) induces death (the outcome of interest).   
Speaking in commonly used terms that are dangerously unclear, an 
analyst assessing the effect of smoking on death should not “control 
away” the “effect” of lung cancer.76 
Thus, in a randomized experiment, the gold standard in causal in-
ference, a clear distinction exists between variables that cannot be af-
fected by the treatment and variables that might be so affected.  Ran-
domization can, and should, balance the former.  Randomization does 
not, and should not, balance the latter.  The importance of time, spe-
cifically the time at which treatment is assigned and applied, is again 
evident.  If a variable is measured before the assignment of treatment, 
then that variable cannot be affected by treatment.  If the variable is 
measured after application of treatment, an analyst must think care-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  74  See, e.g., Paul R. Rosenbaum & Donald B. Rubin, Reducing Bias in Observational Studies 
Using Subclassification on the Propensity Score, 79 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 516, 517–19 (1984). 
  75  See Paul R. Rosenbaum, The Consequences of Adjustment for a Concomitant Variable That 
Has Been Affected by the Treatment, 147 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y SER. A 656 (1984); see also PAUL 
R. ROSENBAUM, OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES 73–74 (2d ed. 2002). 
  76  Although harder to visualize, the reverse can (and does) also happen.  That is, in the smok-
ing, lung cancer, and death hypothetical, one danger is that incorrectly “controlling for” or balanc-
ing on lung cancer (an intermediate outcome, a variable that might itself have been affected by 
treatment) might make it appear that no causal effect exists when in fact such an effect does exist.  
In some situations, however, incorrectly “controlling for” or balancing an intermediate outcome 
can make it appear as though a causal effect exists when in fact there is no such effect.  See, e.g., 
Ho, supra note 20, at 2000.    
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fully as to whether the treatment could affect it.  To return again to 
the salary discrimination running example, suppose that the years of 
education variable is “measured,” in the sense of recorded in the em-
ployer’s computer database, after the employer finds out whether the 
potential employee is male or female, that is, after treatment.  It might 
be plausible to believe nevertheless that the years of education variable 
is unaffected by perceived gender.  An analyst might assume reasona-
bly that the process of recording the number of years an employee 
spent in school is a mechanical matter of transferring a value written 
on a resume or a job application to a computer file, and that there is 
no bias in this process related to perceived gender.  If so, then an ana-
lyst should desire and expect that randomization would balance years 
of education.  In contrast, and as explained in greater detail below, it is 
not clear that a similar assumption would always be plausible with re-
spect to a job level variable; a firm might assign persons to jobs on the 
basis of perceived gender. 
Finally, a word about vocabulary: variables that cannot be affected 
by treatment are often called “covariates,” while variables that are af-
fected by treatment are called “intermediate outcomes.”  Thus, the 
analyst’s job is to separate covariates from intermediate outcomes and 
to examine the latter with particular care. 
E.  Observational Studies:  
Challenges and Some Ways To Address Them 
Experiments that randomize race and gender are not possible.  In 
the civil rights context, courts are typically limited to observational 
data — that is, data that are not gathered from randomized experi-
ments.  In observational studies, the analyst controls neither the treat-
ment each unit receives nor the time at which the unit receives the 
treatment.  This lack of control means that the analyst cannot depend 
on randomization either to distinguish covariates from intermediate 
outcomes or to balance the covariates.  For these reasons, even though 
potential outcome tables, such as Table 4, can (and should) be con-
structed in observational studies, it is not immediately clear how an 
analyst should identify units to donate outcome values to one another 
because it is not clear whether the “donor” unit is sufficiently similar to 
the “donee” unit to make the transfer of values plausible.  Systematic 
differences of the type discussed in section II.D may exist. 
A fundamental premise of the potential outcomes framework as 
applied to observational studies is that because randomization is un-
available either to distinguish covariates from intermediate outcomes 
or to balance covariates, analysts must do so themselves.  In other 
words, the goal in an observational study is to recreate to the extent 
possible a randomized experiment.  To accomplish this goal, the ana-
lyst must (i) sharply identify the units, the treatment, the timing of    
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treatment assignment, and the outcome of interest; (ii) assess the plau-
sibility of underlying assumptions, such as units not interfering with 
one another; (iii) separate covariates from intermediate outcomes; (iv) 
examine the distributions of the covariates in the treatment groups to 
see whether they are balanced; and if not, (v) balance these distribu-
tions.  The first four steps are clear enough.  The last, balancing the 
covariate distributions, means looking for subsets of the data in which 
the two treatment groups have similar patterns of covariate values.  
Units with covariate values in one treatment group that lack rough 
analogues in the other treatment group are “discarded” in the sense 
that they are not used for inference. 
To understand this balancing process, return to the data from Fig-
ure 1, above, which depict salaries versus years worked for men and 
women and are thus a continuation of the running salary discrimina-
tion example.  Recall that Figure 1 demonstrates a problem with the 
regression model standard among employment discrimination experts, 
as represented by the two parallel lines that stretch across the entirety 
of the graph.  Figure 1 shows that even though a visual inspection of 
the data depicts men being paid more than women at any level of 
years worked in which both genders are represented, the standard re-
gression model produces a statistically significant result in women’s 
favor, a result adverse to a female class’s litigation proof.  Graphically, 
the line for women is above the line for men. 
Figure  2 reproduces the Figure 1 data with a critical difference: 
The outcomes of interest (salaries) have been removed.  The search for 
subsets of the data that might be reasonably analogized to data from a 
randomized experiment involves looking for regions of the years-
worked variable in which both treatment types are well represented.  
In Figure 2, the vertical lines at values of five, ten, and fourteen years 
worked divide the data into Regions 1–4, as labeled on the graph.  The 
data in Regions 1 and 4 do not look as though they came from a ran-
domized experiment; only one of the thirty or more units in these re-
gions received treatment F (perceived female).77  It would be unwise to 
attempt inferences in these two regions.  In Regions 2 and 3, however, 
the years-worked covariate appears reasonably balanced — that is, 
there appears to be a sufficient number of units assigned to each 
treatment to allow inference to proceed.  Notice that the analyst can 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  77  A randomized experiment need not have a .5 probability of assigning each of two treatments 
to produce the favorable properties discussed above.  If, however, the probability of one of the 
two (or more) assignments gets too low, it becomes difficult to draw inferences about the effect 
caused by that treatment without a significant amount of data.  With extremely low treatment 
probabilities, there often are not enough units with a particular treatment to discern patterns.  
Figure 2 again provides an example.  How does salary vary by years worked for units perceived 
as female in Region 1?  With only one unit, it is difficult to say.    
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(and should) identify these regions without using the outcome (salary) 
data. 
To be perfectly clear: the implication of applying the potential out-
comes framework to these data is that estimation should not be at-
tempted for employees with fewer than five or greater than (about) 
fourteen years worked.  The analyst discards data, and discarding data 
ordinarily carries a cost, namely, loss of precision.  In other words, the 
resultant causal estimates typically have wider confidence intervals 
and are thus less likely to be deemed statistically significant.  That is 
the price to be paid for relaxing the implausible assumptions regression 
makes.78 
 
















Data From Figure 1 Without the Salary Variable: The analyst can isolate 
subsets of the data that can be analogized to data from a randomized ex-
periment, such as Regions 2 and 3, above.  This process can (and should) 
take place without reference to the outcome (salary) values. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  78  If an analyst perfectly specified a regression equation over the whole range of the data, dis-
carding units in Regions 1 and 4 (and the corresponding loss of precision) would not be necessary.  
As discussed above, however, claims of perfect specification are difficult to credit.  See supra sec-
tion I.B. 
    To the extent that it counsels discarding uninformative data and thus suffering a loss of pre-
cision, the potential outcomes framework might be deemed to favor defendants.  In contrast, the 
implication that intermediate outcomes not be included in balancing (corresponding roughly to 
the assertion that tainted variables not be included on the right hand side of a regression equa-
tion), see supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text, is ordinarily deemed to favor plaintiffs. 
Region 1  Region 2  Region 3  Region 4    
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Having identified these subsets of data,79 one can proceed in a va-
riety of ways; two are illustrated here.  One method is to fit regression 
lines in the subsets of the data.80  Figure 3 shows four such lines, one 
treatment-F and one treatment-M line for the data in each of Regions 
2 and 3.  Notice that the two male (solid) lines largely remain above 
their female (dashed) counterparts in both regions, suggesting that be-
ing perceived female is causing a lower salary.  These four regression 
lines here are worlds apart from the two regression lines in Figure 1 in 
critical ways.  The analyst here is not assuming a constant additive 
treatment effect even within Region 2 or Region 3, in contrast to the 
regression equation example discussed in section I.B.3.b; visually, this 
is clear from the fact that the lines in Figure 3 are not parallel.  The 
separate, non-parallel lines for units receiving treatments M and F al-
low for more complex patterns in the data.  Moreover, the Figure 3 re-
gression lines are fit over smaller ranges of the data than their Figure 1 
counterparts.  The technical assumptions of regression81 (some of 
which this Article does not discuss) are more plausible over the smaller 
ranges of data represented by the Figure 3 regions than over the whole 












  79  Exactly how to divide the data into subsets or blocks is a matter of current research.  There 
is some guidance on the separate issue of how many blocks to define.  See, e.g., W.G. Cochran, 
The Effectiveness of Adjustment by Subclassification in Removing Bias in Observational Studies, 
24 BIOMETRICS 295 (1968). 
  80  This use of regression lines demonstrates that the potential outcomes framework does not 
suggest wholesale abandonment of the regression technique, but rather judicious use of it in a 
way that does not purport to interpret the coefficients causally.  See generally Paul W. Holland, 
The Causal Interpretation of Regression Coefficients, in S TOCHASTIC CAUSALITY 173 (Maria 
Carla Galavotti et al. eds., 2001) (clarifying under what assumptions it might be plausible to have 
a causal interpretation of regression coefficients). 
  81  See, e.g., Yulia Gel et al., The Importance of Checking the Assumptions Underlying Statisti-
cal Analysis: Graphical Methods for Assessing Normality, 46 JURIMETRICS 3 (2005). 
  82  The desire to avoid using a single model (or regression line) over a large range of the data is 
the reason why Regions 2 and 3 are treated separately instead of combined into a single region.    

















































Subset of Figure 1 Data Concentrating on Regions 2 and 3: This graph fo-
cuses on areas of the data in which an analyst may reasonably attempt 
causal inference (Regions 2 and 3) and ignores those where inference 
should not be attempted (Regions 1 and 4).  The solid lines represent the 
best-fitting lines in each region for men.  The dashed grey lines are the 
best-fitting lines in each region for women.  Note that here, in contrast to 
Figure 1, the female lines are below the male lines for almost the entire 
graph, conforming to the intuition that women (not men) suffer from sal-
ary discrimination in this data set.  The figure also shows how to use the 
lines to predict the salary a woman would have received had she been 
male.  Specifically, a dashed line rises up from the diamond at Years 
Worked = 10.5 and then moves over to Salary = $99,700.  Thus, the pre-
diction for the woman in Region 3 with the lowest seniority, the left-most 
diamond in that region, is that she would have earned $99,700 had she 
been a man. 
 
Nor do separate regression lines for M and F units pose a problem 
for inferences in the potential outcomes framework, as they did with 
ordinary regression, as discussed in section I.B.4.  The potential out-
comes framework makes clear that the goal of the analysis is not to es-
timate regression coefficients, but rather to fill in missing potential 
outcome values.  To see how an analyst might use the separate regres-
sion lines to do so, consider the unit assigned treatment F that has the 
lowest value for years worked in Region 3 — that is, the left-most 
Region 2  Region 3    
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diamond in Region 3 of Figure 3, with about 10.5 years worked.  An 
analyst might fill in the missing potential outcome for that unit, the 
salary that would have been observed had that unit received treatment 
M, by putting her finger on the corresponding diamond and traveling 
straight up until the finger intersects the male line.  Then, the analyst 
would move her finger straight to the left until it intersects with the y-
axis.  The corresponding number on the y-axis constitutes a predicted 
value for the counterfactual salary outcome for this unit.  Figure 3 
shows, with a dashed line, this tracing process.  For the unit under 
consideration, the model predicts that had she been perceived as male, 
she would have earned approximately $99,700, as opposed to the ap-
proximately $93,000 she did earn.  The analyst repeats the process for 
each unit until the potential outcomes table is full — that is, all female 
units (in Regions 2 and 3) have an imputed value in the “Salary(M)” 
column, and all male units (in Regions 2 and 3) have an imputed value 
in the “Salary(F)” column.83 
Another way of filling in the missing values of the potential out-
comes table is a species of a process called “matching.”  To understand 
this process, abandon Figure 2 (and its Regions), and consider Table 5, 
below, which, unlike Table 3, includes an additional column to show 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  83  In more technical and precise language, one estimates the regression coefficients associated 
with the M units, then combines these estimates with the F covariate values to predict counterfac-
tual potential outcome values for the F units.  To predict the counterfactual values for the units 
that received treatment M, reverse the process.  There are several ways to generate uncertainty 
estimates.  The easiest and most intuitive is to specify a prior distribution on the regression coeffi-
cients and use Bayesian simulation techniques.  See, e.g., GELMAN ET AL., supra note 58, at 353–
85.  In other words, one fills in missing potential outcome values over and over again with a cer-
tain amount of random noise included each time.  That generates a distribution of the quantity of 
interest. 
    This general approach of marrying coefficients from a model fit to control group data with 
treatment group covariates to generate a counterfactual outcome for the treated data points is of-
ten referred to as the “Peters-Belson” method after the two authors who independently proposed 
it.  See William A. Belson, A Technique for Studying the Effects of a Television Broadcast, 5 AP-
PLIED STAT. 195 (1956); Charles C. Peters, A Method of Matching Groups for Experiment with 
No Loss of Population, 34 J. EDUC. RES. 606 (1941).  As the dates of these references indicate, it 
was proposed prior to what some, see sources cited supra note 17, consider the articulation of the 
potential outcomes framework.  By now it should be clear that while the Peters-Belson method is 
a useful refinement of the regression technique, it is not a substitute for a causal inference frame-
work.  In particular, nothing in the Peters-Belson method suggests separating covariates from in-
termediate outcomes or balancing covariates. 
    The discussion above is intended only to illustrate the Peters-Belson or two-regression tech-
nique (as applied within the potential outcomes framework) conceptually.  An analyst actually 
applying the technique would need to account for at least two sources of uncertainty: the uncer-
tainty in the regression coefficients (by drawing from their posterior) and the uncertainty in the 
counterfactual salary (by drawing from its posterior conditional on a draw of the regression coeffi-
cients).  Thus, the predicted counterfactual salaries would never be exactly where the finger-
tracing technique above would put them, and in any event the regression lines used to do the trac-
ing would change from simulation iteration to iteration.    
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each unit’s number of years worked.  Pretend for a moment that only 
these eight observations exist. 
 
TABLE 5.  TABLE 3, REPRINTED WITH AN ADDITIONAL  
COLUMN FOR YEARS WORKED AND SHADING  
TO EMPHASIZE THE MATCHING OF UNITS 
Unit #  Years Worked  Treatment  Salary(M)  Salary(F) 
1  6.2  F  ??  91,200 
2  9.0  F  ??  92,400 
3  13.2  F  ??  94,100 
4  0.5 M  47,100  ?? 
5  9.3  M  98,900  ?? 
6  5.7  M  97,700  ?? 
7  12.6  M  95,300  ?? 
8  19.1 M  81,300  ?? 
 
Focus for the moment on Unit 1.  To proceed with a causal infer-
ence, an analyst needs a value for what this unit’s salary would have 
been had it received treatment M.  Of the five units in the table that 
actually did receive treatment M, the one that looks the most like Unit 
1 is Unit 6 because among those five units, Unit 6’s 5.7 years worked 
is the most similar to Unit 1’s 6.2.  Thus, it makes sense for Unit 6 to 
donate its observed salary value to be Unit 1’s missing, counterfactual 
value.  Units 1 and 6 are a reasonably close “match.”  One can proceed 
to find reasonable matches for Units 2, 3, 5, and 7 (the pairings of 2 
and 5 and of 3 and 7 seem intuitive).  Units 4 and 8 present a problem: 
both received treatment M, and both have values of years worked that 
are fairly far removed from the values represented in any unit that re-
ceived treatment F.  Under a potential outcomes framework, causal in-
ference is probably not advisable with respect to these units.  The best 
procedure is to ignore them; this is the matching equivalent of ignoring 
the data in Regions 1 and 4 of Figure 2, above.  Overall, the intuition 
with matching is that one has created a mini-randomized experiment 
in each pair of units, with the pairs identified according to their values 
on some other important variable.84 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  84  Years ago, employment discrimination expert witnesses debated the merits of a primitive 
form of what is labeled above as “matching.”  These experts called the technique “cohort analy-
sis.”  Compare Carl C. Hoffman & Dana Quade, Regression and Discrimination: A Case of Lack 
of Fit, 11 SOC. METHODS & RES. 407, 426–38 (1983) (favoring this technique), with Michelson, 
supra note 43, at 169, 177–78 (noting the inadequacies of cohort analysis).  The Hoffman and 
Quade article is extraordinary in its lucid discussion of the problem of finding similar units for 
appropriate comparison, its concomitant emphasis on balancing covariate distributions, and its 
articulation of the failings of regression, particularly the issue of extrapolating across wide ranges 
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The result of this matching process is conceptually the same as the 
result of the regression-lines approach — namely, a completed poten-
tial outcomes table for those units as to which an analogy to a random-
ized experiment makes sense.  For the subset of units represented in 
Tables 3 and 5, the result might resemble Table 6, where imputed sala-
ries are shown in italics. 
 
TABLE 6.  POTENTIAL OUTCOMES TABLE, FULLY IMPUTED 
Unit #  Years Worked  Treatment  Salary(M)  Salary(F) 
1  6.2  F  97,700  91,200 
2  9.0  F  98,900  92,400 
3  13.2  F  95,300  94,100 
5  9.3  M  98,900  92,400 
6  5.7  M  97,700  91,200 
7  12.6  M  95,300  94,100 
 
With the potential outcomes table fully imputed, any quantity of 
interest can be calculated.  One obvious candidate for calculation is 
the average causal effect of gender on salary levels for all units.85  In a 
salary discrimination lawsuit, however, the real target of inference is 
the members of the plaintiff class, so a more interesting quantity might 
be the average causal effect for women — that is, for those units that 
received treatment F.  From Table 6, that quantity would be 1/3 * 
((91,200-97,700) + (92,400-98,900) + (94,100-95,300)) = -4733.  Thus, in 
the running example of salary discrimination, after an analysis of the 
data from Table 3, an expert witness could testify as follows: For 
members of the plaintiff class as to which a causal conclusion could be 
made, the fact that the defendant firm perceived them to be female 
caused the firm to reduce their salaries by approximately $4700 on av-
erage.  Notice, moreover, that the expert (with a larger data set) could 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
of the covariate space.  See Hoffman & Quade, supra.  It appears that the article was ignored, 
which is a pity. 
   Other commentators appear to be feeling their way toward something like matching, al-
though they appear to appreciate fully neither the issues at stake nor the power of the technique 
in drawing inferences of causation.  See, e.g., CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 12, § 11.10[1], at 11–
25.  As demonstrated by the cases Michelson collects, supra, courts largely rejected cohort analysis 
because (supposedly) (i) it was unsupported in the literature and (ii) it had low power to detect 
discrimination.  In my view, the former problem stemmed from the fact that the technique was 
never linked to an explicit definition of and framework for causal inference, while the latter re-
sulted from difficulties encountered when experts attempted to achieve exact or nearly exact 
matches in the presence of multiple covariates and limited data.  Multiple covariates and limited 
data resulted in few pairs being deemed permissible matches, and thus the cohort analysis had 
low power to detect discrimination.  As this Article demonstrates, both problems can now be ad-
dressed.  The explicit causal paradigm is, of course, the potential outcomes framework, while the 
problem of achieving balance on multiple covariates is discussed infra section II.F. 
  85  See supra note 71 and accompanying text.    
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also make calculations specific to subsets of the plaintiff class, such as 
those at the low end or the high end of years worked, by isolating the 
relevant units in the potential outcomes table and doing similar arith-
metic.  Such flexibility was not available from the simple regression 
model discussed in section I.B.3.b.86 
The two methods briefly outlined above, separate regression lines 
and matching, should provide roughly similar completed potential out-
comes tables and thus roughly similar substantive results.  The reason 
is that the analyst has done the hard work of isolating subsets of the 
data to treat them as mini-randomized experiments first, and with 
data that came from a randomized experiment, the statistical tech-
nique used during analysis matters less.87  If the results obtained by 
these methods differ substantially, the analyst should be wary; it would 
appear that even after attempting to make the data look as though 
they came from a randomized experiment, the results are still sensitive 
to modeling assumptions. 
F.  The Need for Lots of Background Variables 
The previous sections explain that obtaining balance in covariates 
is a key part of causal inference and that randomized experiments bal-
ance covariates regardless of whether the covariates are measured by 
the experimenter or are unobserved.  In observational studies, how-
ever, the analyst must balance by isolating subsets of data with similar 
covariate values.  These facts lead to an important difficulty with ob-
servational studies, which in turn leads to a critical (often the most 
critical) assumption.  The basic problem is that analysts cannot bal-
ance variables that they do not observe.  To draw causal inferences 
from an observational study, an analyst must assume that she has 
measured all of the really “important” covariates — that is, the covari-
ates that affect both the probability of receiving a particular treatment 
and the values of the potential outcomes.88 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  86  Again, certain technical details in this discussion, such as how to generate estimates of un-
certainty, are deliberately suppressed.  Note that active research is ongoing on this specific sub-
ject.  E.g., Alberto Abadie & Guido W. Imbens, On the Failure of the Bootstrap for Matching Es-
timators (May 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~imbens/ 
bootstrap.pdf. 
  87  See, e.g., Robert J. LaLonde, Evaluating the Econometric Evaluations of Training Programs 
with Experimental Data, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 604 (1986). 
  88  This assumption is also present in regression as used in modern civil rights litigation.  In 
fact, the role of this particular assumption in an observational study is not new or unique to the 
potential outcomes framework.  The problem goes by various names in various fields; “selection 
bias” and “presence of confounders” are two that are popular in econometrics.  One may also 
analogize this issue to the problem of “omitted variable bias,” although this term is more com-
monly used in conjunction with a particular model (such as regression), while the concept here is 
more general.    
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In the salary employment discrimination example, for instance, an 
analyst never has direct measurements of variables such as “motiva-
tion” or “competence” (assuming such concepts to be well defined).   
Their absence could cause difficulties if, for example, (i) these variables 
are distributed differently among persons perceived male versus per-
sons perceived female, and (ii) the defendant firm bases its salary deci-
sions on something related to these variables that the analyst does not 
observe.  In a courtroom setting, these difficulties should not be over-
stated; defendants will invariably claim that missing variables explain 
any observed disparity, and judges who uncritically accept such expla-
nations render discrimination law unenforceable, at least via the class 
action device.  Nevertheless, the fact that analysts cannot balance 
what they do not see suggests that they should attempt to see as many 
of the variables the defendant firm used (or claims to have used) in its 
decisionmaking as possible.89  If measurements of the variables that 
the defendant firm actually used are unavailable, the analyst might re-
sort to related covariates.  The hope is that by achieving balance in the 
related covariates, the analyst achieves balance on the important   
variables. 
This discussion leads to a final principle that must be explained be-
fore one can apply the potential outcomes framework to civil rights 
data sets: how to balance multiple covariates simultaneously.  To un-
derstand the problem, consider the matching technique outlined in the 
previous section and recall the discussion of how in Table 5 the values 
of the years-worked variable suggested matching Unit 1 to Unit 6.  
Imagine now that a second variable, such as years of education, was 
measured and that with respect to the years-of-education variable, 
Unit  1’s closest potential match was Unit 5.  To which of the two 
should Unit 1 be matched: Unit 6 (its closest fit on years worked) or 
Unit 5 (its closest fit on years of education)?  Moving away from the 
matching technique specifically, how does one achieve balance on sev-
eral covariates at once? 
The potential outcomes framework literature has focused on this 
problem for decades, and a variety of answers now exist.  One popular 
option is to estimate something called a “propensity score,” which is 
the probability that a particular unit receives a particular treatment.  
The analyst uses the observed covariates, together with a statistical 
model or technique, to estimate a probability for each unit that it re-
ceived one of the two treatments.  The idea, again, is to recreate a 
randomized experiment by imagining that treatment application was 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  89  Quantitative techniques are available to assess the sensitivity of causal inferences to un-
measured covariates.  The classic example in the observational study context is Jerome Cornfield 
et al., Smoking and Lung Cancer: Recent Evidence and a Discussion of Some Questions, 22 J. 
NAT’L CANCER INST. 173 (1959).    
2008]  CAUSAL INFERENCE  575 
in fact random, but that the analyst “lost” the probabilities used in the 
random assignment.  If lost probabilities can be recovered with rea-
sonable accuracy, and if certain technical assumptions are met, then 
effective balancing of the propensity scores will induce effective bal-
ancing of the observed covariates.90  Note that an analyst can use a 
variety of statistical methods to check whether such balance has in 
fact been achieved, and if it has not, the analyst can modify the origi-
nal propensity score model.91  Again, the process is somewhat techni-
cal, but the point is that by estimating propensity scores, analysts can 
reduce the problem of simultaneously balancing many covariates down 
to a problem of balancing one variable.  In this sense, the propensity 
score acts as a one-dimensional summary of the covariates.92  Nothing 
in this process of balancing multiple covariates — the hard work of 
causal inference in an observational study — requires the use of the 
outcome variable (for example, salary in the running gender discrimi-
nation hypothetical). 
III.  POTENTIAL OUTCOMES IN THE  
CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION SETTING 
This Part demonstrates how the potential outcomes definition of 
and framework for causation may be applied in the civil rights litiga-
tion context, particularly in the areas of capital punishment, employ-
ment discrimination, and vote dilution.  In doing so, this Part demon-
strates that the potential outcomes framework addresses problems 
discussed in section I.B that regression could not.  In particular, this 
Part argues that one can often identify primitives (units, treatment, 
timing of treatment assignment, and outcome) and articulate coherent 
questions linked to available data in the capital punishment and em-
ployment discrimination contexts, but that matters can become more 
difficult in the vote dilution setting. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  90  See, e.g., Paul R. Rosenbaum & Donald B. Rubin, The Central Role of the Propensity Score 
in Observational Studies for Causal Effects, 70 BIOMETRIKA 41, 41 (1983). 
  91  See, e.g., Kosuke Imai et al., Misunderstandings Between Experimentalists and Observa-
tionalists About Causal Inference, 171 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y SER. A 481, 498 (2008).  In addition 
to the propensity score–based methods, other algorithms are discussed in, for instance, Alexis 
Diamond & Jasjeet S. Sekhon, Genetic Matching for Estimating Causal Effects: A General Multi-
variate Matching Method for Achieving Balance in Observational Studies (June 12, 2008) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://sekhon.berkeley.edu/papers/GenMatch.pdf. 
  92  The literature that discusses or uses propensity score methods is extensive.  The articles col-
lected in MATCHED SAMPLING FOR CAUSAL EFFECTS (Donald B. Rubin ed., 2006) are a good 
place to start.  The articles collected there also demonstrate the use of the propensity score as a 
one-dimensional summary of the covariates for purposes of blocking.  See generally supra note 79.    
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A.  In General 
1.  Identifying Primitive Concepts. — In the civil rights context, as 
in any other area of causal inference, an analyst’s first task is to iden-
tify the units, the treatment, the timing of treatment assignment, and 
the outcome variable.  In most instances, the units are individual peo-
ple or cases: criminal defendants or victims in the capital punishment 
context, employees or applicants in employment discrimination.  The 
outcome of interest is something assigned by an institutional or socio-
economic actor: the imposition of capital punishment by juries or sal-
ary received from a defendant employer.  The treatment is ordinarily 
the institutional or socioeconomic actor’s perception of a prohibited 
personal characteristic (gender, race, national origin). 
Why identify the treatment as perceived gender (or race), as op-
posed to self-identified gender (or race), or actual gender (or race), as-
suming that there is general agreement on the meaning of actual gen-
der (or race)?93  There are a variety of reasons, many of them 
technical.94  For the purposes of this discussion, one is sufficient: time.  
As explained previously, one must specify the time at which treatment 
was applied.95  Furthermore, and as noted above, in the civil rights 
context we typically wish to assess whether some actor’s decisions as 
to a group of individuals were affected by some characteristic common 
to the group.96  The law’s focus on the specific actor’s decisionmaking 
requires, indeed compels, the analyst to regard as “given” the charac-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  93  In fact, in the racial context in particular, scholars have difficulty agreeing on an “objective” 
definition.  Thinkers in a wide variety of fields believe that race is a social construct, not a bio-
logical set of characteristics.  See, e.g., PAUL W. HOLLAND, EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE, 
CAUSATION  AND RACE 3 (2003); IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE  BY LAW: THE LEGAL CON-
STRUCTION OF RACE xxi (10th anniversary ed., rev. 2006); Am. Ass’n of Physical Anthropolo-
gists, AAPA Statement on Biological Aspects of Race, 101 AM. J. PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
569, 569–70 (1996), available at http://www.physanth.org/positions/race.html; Am. Anthropologi-
cal Ass’n, Statement on “Race” (May 17, 1998), http://www.aaanet.org/stmts/racepp.htm; see also 
Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604,  610 n.4 ( 1987).  But see  18 U.S.C. § 1093(6) 
(2006) (defining “racial group” in terms of “physical characteristics or biological descent”). 
  94  A primary issue with defining the prohibited characteristic variable is that some influential 
quantitative analysts, including several involved in the development and articulation of the poten-
tial outcomes framework (see supra note 17), view the study of causation as well-defined only 
when the conceptualized “treatment” is an intervention (actual or hypothetical, depending on the 
analyst), and that immutable characteristics (being immutable) are not subject to change or ma-
nipulation.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. BERK, REGRESSION ANALYSIS: A CONSTRUCTIVE CRI-
TIQUE 90–92 (2004); HOLLAND, supra note 93, at 3; Donald B. Rubin, Bayesian Inference for 
Causality: The Importance of Randomization, in AM. STAT. ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SO-
CIAL STATISTICS SECTION 233, 233 (1975).  Don Rubin and I examine these and other concerns 
in a forthcoming paper, D. James Greiner & Donald B. Rubin, Potential Outcomes and Causal 
Effects of Immutable Characteristics (July 12,  2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library). 
  95  See supra section II.A. 
  96  See supra section I.B.3.a.    
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teristics of individuals that were in place prior to the individuals’ in-
teraction with the actor.  The only way to do that is to define the 
treatment as taking place at some moment of perception by the actor 
of the characteristic common to the group. 
A hypothetical example may clarify matters.  In an employment 
discrimination disparate treatment case focusing on hiring, a class of 
African American applicants claims intentional discrimination, and the 
plaintiffs demonstrate that the defendant hired a lower percentage of 
black applicants than white applicants.  In response, the employer 
proves that it hired based on education, and that members of the Afri-
can American class had lower educational achievement levels.  At re-
buttal, the plaintiffs demonstrate that their concededly lower education 
achievement levels were the result of societal and governmental race 
discrimination, including (to make this hypothetical perfectly clear) a 
system of de jure segregated schools.  What result?  Assuming no 
doubt as to these proofs and no other relevant circumstances, the re-
sult is a ruling for the employer.  In legal terms, Title VII compels the 
defendant firm to avoid its own discrimination, not to take remedial 
action based on someone else’s.  In statistical terms, the employer   
is entitled to condition on the educational achievements of all appli-
cants, to take these achievements as it finds them without asking what 
led up to them.  And in terms of the potential outcomes framework, 
the law compels analysts to treat educational achievement as a covari-
ate, something unaffected by treatment.  Thus, for timing purposes, 
what matters is not actual race or actual gender (which is usually con-
ceptualized as being set before birth), even if there were a general con-
sensus on what those terms mean.  Rather, what matters is the state of 
the world as of some moment of the social or governmental actor’s 
perception. 
This discussion demonstrates that an analyst should ordinarily con-
sider treatment assigned as of the moment in which the social or gov-
ernmental actor first perceives the prohibited characteristic of interest.  
Ordinarily, the actor’s perception of a unit’s gender or race will not 
change over time; that is, the treatment remains stable as of the mo-
ment of first interaction.  Moreover, it is usually unsafe to assume that 
if the socioeconomic or governmental actor does discriminate, it delays 
or limits its discrimination in some way.  For example, in the salary 
discrimination running hypothetical, if an analyst is assessing whether 
the defendant firm awards employees perceived female lower salaries 
than employees perceived male, does it make sense for the analyst to 
assume that the firm evaluates performance without regard to gen-   
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der?97  Such evaluations can include a heavy dose of subjectivity and 
are determined after the evaluator perceives employee gender.  Thus, 
the fact that this kind of variable may be affected by the prohibited 
characteristic under study suggests that it may be an intermediate out-
come as defined in the previous section — a variable whose value is 
affected by treatment. 
The issue of sharply identifying the timing of treatment assignment 
dovetails with another of critical importance, namely, precisely identi-
fying the institutional or socioeconomic actor whose behavior is to be 
studied.  Much depends on the analyst’s exercise of judgment here.  
For example, in the capital punishment context, should the analyst as-
sess the effect of (say, the victim’s) perceived race on the criminal jus-
tice system as a whole, on the prosecutor’s charging decisions, on jury 
behavior, or on the decisions of appellate courts?  If an analyst at-
tempts to assess the effect of race on the whole system, can she safely 
treat any characteristics of the case as unaffected by the treatment?  In 
less technical terms, would it be safe to assume in such a study that 
police investigate homicides of African Americans or Hispanics in the 
same way as homicides of whites?  If such assumptions should be 
viewed with skepticism,98 then variables such as the heinousness of an 
offense or even the number of victims in a particular criminal “occur-
rence” may be intermediate outcomes.  If the analyst attempts to study 
the effect of the victim’s perceived race on the whole system, there 
may be few variables that could safely be assumed to be unaffected by 
treatment. 
In this regard, the use of years worked as a balancing variable in 
this Article’s salary discrimination running example is deliberately pro-
vocative.  Buried inside a variable such as years worked are a host of 
decisions that might well be characterized as intermediate outcomes.  
Some employees may have been fired, perhaps discriminatorily, or may 
have chosen to leave rather than face the unpleasant task of fighting a 
Title VII lawsuit.  Certainly, if the analyst chooses the firm (as opposed 
to one of its employees) as the institutional actor to study, and concep-
tualizes the timing of treatment assignment as occurring at the mo-
ment of first perception (meaning, probably, at the time of an employ-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  97  It is possible that a firm does limit its discrimination to certain areas of activity.  Irrational 
prejudices are, alas, irrational, and they may operate only in certain socioeconomic spaces or at 
certain times.  My point here is that it will ordinarily be unwise to assume that such discrimina-
tion is not taking place. 
  98  See Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities 
in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 44 (1984) (discussing 
empirical evidence that “official descriptions of homicides by prosecutors were affected by racial 
considerations”).    
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ment application), years worked is post-treatment and thus may be an 
intermediate outcome as opposed to a covariate. 
The discussion above demonstrates the delicate balance an analyst 
attempting causal inference in the civil rights context must strike 
among competing concerns such as the nature of the problem to be 
analyzed and the plausibility of the assumptions necessary to proceed.  
Much depends on identification of the question.  A fundamental aim of 
this Article is to persuade (i) that these choices are at least as impor-
tant, perhaps more so, to the answers produced than are disagreements 
about models, statistical techniques, or computer software; and (ii) that 
none of these choices is mathematical or technical.  No such decision is 
beyond the ken of the average layperson.  Previous paragraphs suggest 
that it might be difficult, without strong and potentially risky assump-
tions, to assess the effect of the victim’s perceived race on the entirety 
of the system that administers capital punishment.  But difficulty is 
not the only concern.  If an analyst can identify primitives (units, 
treatment, treatment timing, and outcome of interest) and articulate 
the assumptions that would be required to proceed, perhaps the risky 
assumptions are worth making, so long as the analyst states them 
clearly. 
Having identified the units, the treatment, the timing of treatment 
assignment, and the potential outcomes of interest, the analyst should 
inquire as to the nature of the data available.  This is not the same as 
examining the data.  The analyst should do the hard work of (i) classi-
fying variables into covariates versus intermediate outcomes and (ii) 
balancing covariates, all without having access to the outcome meas-
urements.  In other words, particularly in a litigation setting, an expert 
witness should specifically request that she not be provided with the 
outcome data at first.  This way of proceeding decreases the danger 
identified in section I.B.1 as a principal failing of regression, namely, 
improperly favoring one side or the other by snooping for a preferred 
result during the model fitting process, because without access to the 
outcome data, the analyst has less idea what the litigation answer will 
be as she works.99 
This is a situation in which early intervention and ongoing over-
sight by the trial judge (or, more likely, a magistrate or a special mas-
ter) can encourage both sides’ experts to commit to models before re-
sults are available, making settlement more likely.  For example, the 
court in a large-scale Title VII class action can begin by prohibiting 
transmission of data to any testifying expert until, through discovery 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  99  There are, concededly, some limited ways for the fallen to cheat, but they are both harder to 
implement and easier to detect than the model-snooping that is so easy to accomplish when check-
ing the fit of regression equations.  See supra section I.B.1.    
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and any necessary rulings, available variables have been identified and 
the process of their generation understood.  Next, the court could, to 
the extent consistent with the role of a jury (if any),100 adjudicate dis-
putes as to which variables are pre- and post-treatment, and as to the 
post-treatment variables, which ones are unlikely to have been affected 
by treatment.  Then, the court might allow transmission of the data 
corresponding to pre-treatment variables, post-treatment variables un-
affected by treatment, and the treatment itself to the parties’ experts.  
The experts could implement the balancing process and disclose to 
each other which subsets of data each deems sufficiently similar to a 
randomized experiment to allow causal inference to proceed.  The 
point is to require experts to commit, in a way difficult to disavow 
later, to critical parts of their analyses before knowing what the results 
will be.  Finally, upon being satisfied that both sides have committed 
in this way, the court could order the release of the outcome data.  The 
hope is that, because both sides have done the hard work of balancing 
covariates before knowing the results, their conclusions will be similar 
to one another, easing settlement.  At a minimum, important stages of 
the analysis will be less susceptible to biasing by experts, some of 
whom may be fighting a subconscious battle with themselves. 
If this procedure cannot be implemented, civil rights litigants might 
nevertheless wish to ask their testifying expert to proceed via potential 
outcomes as opposed to regression.  As noted above, a trier of fact may 
(and should) give greater weight to an expert who truthfully testifies 
that she committed to an analysis before knowing its substantive re-
sults.  In this way, one might hope that the incentive structure of liti-
gation could make the use of potential outcomes self-executing. 
As suggested above, classifying variables as covariates or interme-
diate outcomes — unaffected by treatment versus affected by treat-
ment — requires the analyst to understand the data-generating process 
thoroughly.  This classification process benefits from a sharp definition 
of the treatment, particularly its timing.  For this reason, the analyst 
using potential outcomes has a better idea of which variables to in-
clude in balancing.  The basic rule is that any variable measured prior 
to the application of treatment is a covariate that should be included 
in balancing.  Anything measured contemporaneously with treatment 
application or assessed afterward is suspect and should be treated as a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  100  The ideas articulated in this paragraph and the next seem consistent with the trial judge’s 
inherent power to control pretrial proceedings as well as his or her gatekeeper role with respect to 
expert testimony.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993); see also 
D.H. Kaye, The Dynamics of Daubert: Methodology, Conclusions, and Fit in Statistical and 
Econometric Studies, 87 V A. L. REV. 1933, 2008 (2001) (arguing that the fact that a statistical 
study relies on regression is an insufficient basis upon which to conclude that the study passes 
muster under Daubert’s interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence).    
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covariate only if the analyst may reasonably conclude that the vari-
able’s value is unaffected by treatment.  In the salary discrimination 
running example, the variable for years of education is a reasonable 
candidate for inclusion in balancing; absent other evidence, it might be 
plausible to assume that this variable’s values were recorded in an es-
sentially mechanical process from an employment application or re-
sume.  Other variables are more suspect, particularly those with inher-
ent subjectivity, such as performance evaluations.  Should a dispute 
arise as to whether to balance a variable whose values are determined 
after treatment application, the burden of persuasion should be on the 
party seeking to categorize such a variable as a covariate instead of as 
an intermediate outcome. 
Thus, within the potential outcomes framework, an analyst finds 
guidance on the issue of which variables to include, while the balanc-
ing process (which, again, should take place without reference to 
measured outcomes) provides information on which observations 
should be the focus of analysis.  Courts find guidance on how to assign 
burdens of proof.  The potential outcomes paradigm addresses prob-
lems that regression (as commonly used in modern civil rights litiga-
tion) could not. 
After achieving acceptable covariate balance, the analyst can use a 
variety of techniques, such as matching or separate regressions for 
treated and control groups, to fill in the counterfactual outcome for 
each unit.  Regression coefficients themselves (if regressions are used at 
all) are of little interest.  The outcomes the model predicts, not the es-
timated coefficients, are what matter.  Thus, expert witnesses, litiga-
tors, and courts need no longer attempt to shoehorn data into models 
with poor fits but with easily interpretable coefficients, such as the 
constant additive effect model described in section I.B.3.b.  Courts and 
litigators may focus less on grasping or explaining logarithms of odds 
ratios, per section I.B.3.d.  Instead, they can concentrate on figuring 
out what would have occurred “but for” the identified treatment, a 
task litigators, judges, and juries can understand. 
2.  A Tug-of-War: The Need for Background Variables Versus the 
Desire To Detect Discrimination. — In drawing inferences of causa-
tion in the civil rights context, one issue arises often enough to deserve 
special consideration.  An example may illustrate.  In the employment 
discrimination context, if an analyst chooses the employer as the insti-
tutional actor whose behavior is to be assessed (a reasonable choice 
given that the employer as a firm, and not an individual officer of the 
firm, is the defendant in the lawsuit), then the analyst should ordinar-
ily conceive of treatment (perceived gender, race, ethnicity, etc.) as as-
signed at the time of employees’ job applications.  Many application 
forms include race and gender boxes, and certainly if any sort of inter-
view is required for the job, the prohibited characteristic of interest 
will be apparent at that time.  The treatment presumptively occurs    
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quite early in the relationship between the units and the actor of inter-
est.  Recall that a critical assumption of an observational study is that 
the analyst has measured a sufficient number of the important covari-
ates (pretreatment variables) so that, after achieving balance in the co-
variates, members of one treatment group are not systematically dif-
ferent from members of the other.  Recall also that analysts should not 
balance on variables whose values are affected by treatment.  The 
problem in conceiving of treatment as being assigned at the time of a 
job application is that a great many variables as to which measure-
ments may be available (for example, tasks or projects accomplished, 
types of experience gained, or nature of training received, not to men-
tion performance evaluations, disciplinary actions, initial job levels, 
bonuses, etc.) have values that are determined after treatment.  In fact, 
much of the information in a class member’s employment file, includ-
ing even the fact that she was hired, is determined after treatment.  
Thus, few variables may be presumptively considered covariates.   
With fewer covariates, the assumption that the analyst has measured a 
sufficient number of the important ones becomes strained. 
This concern suggests conceptualizing treatment as occurring later 
in the employment relationship, if doing so would be plausible.  For 
example, if a Title VII disparate treatment class action focuses on the 
class members’ failure to achieve a particular kind of promotion, and 
if promotion decisions were made by an official within the defendant 
firm who had little prior interaction with employees eligible for promo-
tion, the analyst might identify this official as the socioeconomic actor 
whose behavior is under study, and thus conceptualize treatment as 
having occurred when this official perceived the gender (or other pro-
hibited characteristic) of the promotion applicants.  That choice would 
allow more variables, such as performance evaluations, job assign-
ments, etc., to be considered covariates and thus be subject to balanc-
ing.  But this course of action has costs.  One of these costs is that any 
discrimination perpetrated by the defendant firm before the promotion 
application stage, such as while evaluating performance, could go un-
detected.  Balancing on the performance evaluation variables would 
mask the discrimination in the same way that balancing on lung can-
cer could mask the effect of smoking on death. 
The problem described here is a general one that occurs whenever 
one attempts to draw inferences of causation in a civil rights context in 
which the interaction between potential plaintiffs and the institutional 
actor of interest extends over a period of time.  A tug-of-war exists be-
tween (a) the desire to include in balancing as many variables as pos-
sible to make plausible the assumption that one has taken care of the 
important ones, which counsels in favor of considering treatment to 
have been assigned late in the interaction between the units and the 
institutional actor of interest; and (b) the desire to understand and 
model properly the fullness of the relationship between the institu-   
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tional actor and the units, including by assessing the possibility of dis-
crimination early in that relationship, which counsels in favor of con-
ceptualizing treatment to have been assigned as early as possible. 
One way to address this tug-of-war is by making assumptions, sup-
ported by reasonable judgment, about what variables have been af-
fected by the treatment.  Here, the analyst identifies variables whose 
values are (i) determined after treatment, but are (ii) less likely to have 
been affected by treatment, and (iii) likely to be related (strongly re-
lated, one hopes) to the values of important unobserved covariates.   
The analyst includes these post-treatment variables in the balancing 
process, the hope being that in doing so, she balances important pre-
treatment covariates while not inducing bias (in a statistical sense) in 
the results.  In the aforementioned promotions example, perhaps inves-
tigation into the defendant firm’s operations reveals that employees re-
ceive assignments based only on their current workload and the type 
of tasks that require completion.  Or it may be that the training pro-
grams a firm offers are ordinarily open to all employees who wish to 
undertake them.  Or it could be that a part of the process of evaluating 
employee performance is mechanical — for example, the number of 
DVD packages processed per minute.101  In that case, the analyst 
might attempt to resolve the tug-of-war articulated above by balancing 
on variables measuring types of job experience, number and nature of 
training programs, and the mechanically reported aspects of perform-
ance.  The analyst should, however, be particularly wary of variables 
that inherently involve a partially subjective judgment, such as overall 
job evaluation.102 
B.  Specific Contexts 
1.  Capital Punishment. — Drawing causal inferences about the 
role of race in the administration of the death penalty poses several 
challenges, some familiar, some unique to the capital setting.  A logical 
place to begin is with the identification of the treatment.  The litera-
ture in this area suggests that the treatment should be defined in terms 
of perceived race of both the victim and the defendant.  For example, 
in a jurisdiction made up almost exclusively of Caucasians and African 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  101  See Susan Sheehan, Tear, Slap, Clack, NEW YORKER, Aug. 28, 2006, at 26 (describing a 
Netflix facility).  Unfortunately, some forms of discrimination, such as perpetration of a hostile 
working environment, can affect an employee’s performance even as measured by the most neu-
tral of criteria or by reference to the most mechanical tasks.  This is a problem, and it haunts any 
analysis framework (potential outcomes or otherwise).  One would expect that the actions taken to 
communicate a message of inferiority or stigma to certain employees might leave a non-
quantitative evidentiary trail. 
  102  Courts have on occasion recognized the danger here.  See, e.g., Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. 
Supp. 1269, 1280 n.10 (D.D.C. 1988); Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050, 1057 (E.D. Va. 
1984).    
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Americans, the analyst could divide cases into four treatment catego-
ries: white defendant, black victim; white defendant, white victim; 
black defendant, black victim; black defendant, white victim.103  Each 
unit, or case, would then have four potential outcomes, only one of 
which is observed.  Although in a real study an analyst would proba-
bly want to have four treatment groups, for the sake of illustrating 
principles suppose for the moment that the analyst is interested in 
race-of-the-victim effects only, such that there are two treatments, “B” 
for victim perceived black and “W” for victim perceived white. 
Next, the analyst must choose the institutional actor whose behav-
ior is to be studied.  If the analyst follows the presumption that treat-
ment is administered as of the moment the institutional actor first per-
ceives the victim’s race, then much depends on this choice.  Suppose 
the analyst identifies the actor as the criminal justice system.  From 
case files, the available variables will be those that the police, the 
prosecutor, and other official sources have uncovered and recorded af-
ter they perceive the victim’s race, that is, after treatment application.  
These post-treatment variables must be assessed carefully to see 
whether it is reasonable to assume that the treatment does not affect 
their values.  Consider something as simple as whether the murder 
was for hire.  The value the analyst sees for this variable is not 
whether, in some abstract sense of “truth,” the murder was for hire, 
but rather the value determined by a police investigation.  It seems 
odd, if one is assessing the race effects in the entire criminal justice 
system, to assume that police investigate homicides of whites with 
equal vigor as homicides of blacks.  Thus, the analyst must think care-
fully about which variables, if any, may be deemed unaffected by 
treatment if the institutional actor of interest is the criminal justice sys-
tem.  On the other hand, if the analyst chooses the jury as the actor 
whose behavior is to be assessed, then the facts as discovered by the 
police (and the defense investigation) may be taken as given on the 
principle that any discrimination by the police is not chargeable to the 
jury.  But among other things, any racial bias in police investigations 
(for example) will go undetected.  The tug-of-war identified in section 
III.A.2 is fully apparent here. 
For the sake of illustrating other questions that arise, suppose for 
the remainder of this section that the analyst chooses the jury as the 
actor of interest.  The remaining “primitives” are the timing of treat-
ment application and the outcome.  The first should be easy to iden-
tify; as articulated above, the presumption should be that treatment is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  103  If there are a small number of cases fitting a treatment category, the analyst can either re-
move units in that treatment category from the analysis or collapse it together with another cate-
gory (thus redefining the treatments).  To reiterate a point made several times in this Article, this 
choice is not mathematical.    
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applied when the jury first perceives the victim’s race.  To be safe, an 
analyst might conceptualize the perception as having occurred at the 
earliest possible moment, perhaps during jury selection.104  Identifying 
an outcome to study can be more tricky.  After Furman v. Georgia,105 
most capital systems include two phases, guilt and penalty.  A great 
deal of scholarly attention has been focused on the latter, perhaps be-
cause the guilt phase of a capital trial is similar to trial of lesser of-
fenses.  The penalty phase of capital trials, in contrast, includes elabo-
rate and unusual procedural safeguards designed, in theory at least, to 
prevent arbitrary administration of the law’s severest punishment.106   
Thus, assume for the moment that the question of interest is the effect 
of the perceived race of the victim on the probability that a jury will 
sentence a defendant convicted of a death-eligible crime to die. 
With these sharp definitions of the primitives, much is clarified, in-
cluding the fact that at least one critical issue remains: the relationship 
of when the jury perceives the race of the victim to the jury’s decisions 
on guilt and punishment.  The analyst may be interested in the penalty 
phase alone, but, per the discussion above, treatment is administered 
earlier, before the jury renders a verdict on guilt.  Is it safe to assume 
that the treatment had no effect on the jury’s guilt or innocence deci-
sion?  Probably not.  In other words, if we believe it worthwhile to 
study whether the victim’s perceived race has an effect on a jury’s 
punishment decision, it seems odd to assume that the victim’s per-
ceived race had no effect on the same jury’s prior verdict of guilt or 
innocence of a death-eligible offense. 
To clarify, suppose, in a particular case, the treatment assigned is 
“W,” that is, that the jury perceives the race of the victim to be white; 
that in the first stage of proceedings, the jury convicts the defendant of 
capital murder; and that in the second stage of the proceedings, the 
jury sentences the defendant to die.  Does it make any sense to talk 
about what the jury’s decision in that same case at the second stage of 
the trial would have been under treatment “B” if, had the jury per-
ceived the victim to be black, it would have acquitted (or found the 
defendant guilty of only a non-capital offense)?107  Here, a focus on a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  104  Cf. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36–37 (1986) (holding that a defendant in a cross-racial 
capital trial has a constitutional right to inform the venire of the race of the victim and question 
potential jurors about racial prejudices). 
  105  408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
  106  See Turner, 476 U.S. at 33–39. 
  107  The fundamental issue here is that the characteristics of one phase of a capital trial might 
induce outcome-determinative alterations in a jury’s behavior at the other phase.  See Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302–03 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding North Carolina’s manda-
tory death penalty statute unconstitutional in part because juries would exercise unbridled discre-
tion in refusing to convict defendants of death-eligible offenses to avoid the mandatory capital 
punishment); see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334–35 (1976).    
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variable occurring after treatment, the phase one verdict, is necessary 
because unless that variable takes a certain value (conviction of a 
death-eligible crime), the outcome of interest (the choice between a 
sentence of death or life imprisonment) has no defined value.  Recall 
that under the potential outcomes framework, a causal effect is defined 
in terms of a comparison of potential outcomes of the variable of inter-
est under alternative forms of treatment.  To answer the question of 
interest, that is, the effect of the victim’s perceived race on the jury’s 
penalty phase decisionmaking, an analyst must isolate those units 
(cases) in which a jury would convict the defendant of a death-eligible 
offense under both treatment B and treatment W.  Only then does it 
make sense to compare the outcomes of the penalty phase under the 
two treatment assignments. 
In table form, the problem can be illustrated as follows: 
 
TABLE 7.  POTENTIAL OUTCOMES TABLE  
WITH A CRUCIAL INTERMEDIATE OUTCOME108  
















1 White  ?? No  ?? Undef. 
2 White  ?? Yes  ?? Yes 
3 White  ?? Yes  ?? Yes 
4 Black  No  ?? Undef.  ?? 
5 Black  Yes  ?? No  ?? 
6 Black  Yes  ?? No  ?? 
 
In Table 7, it is clear that Units 1 and 4 do not belong in the study.  
Neither was convicted of a death-eligible offense, so the analyst knows 
that because of the potential outcome under one treatment (the one ac-
tually received), a comparison of punishment under treatment “B” to 
punishment under treatment “W” makes no sense.  But the analyst 
cannot stop there.  Suppose it were the case that missing ?? values in 
Table  7 were in truth filled in as per Table 8.  These values would 
never be directly observed, so Table 8 is for illustration.  Filled-in val-






  108  “Undef.” is an abbreviation for “undefined,” both here and in later tables.    
2008]  CAUSAL INFERENCE  587 
TABLE 8: POTENTIAL OUTCOMES TABLE WITH A  
CRUCIAL INTERMEDIATE OUTCOME, ALL VALUES FILLED IN 
















1 White  No No  Undef. Undef. 
2 White  No Yes  Undef. Yes 
3 White  Yes Yes  No Yes 
4 Black  No  Yes Undef.  Yes 
5 Black  Yes  No No  Undef. 
6 Black  Yes  Yes No  Yes 
 
Now, it is clear that Units 2 and 5 also have no place in the study, 
for the same reason that Units 1 and 4 do not belong.  For each of 
these units, the outcome of interest is undefined under one of the two 
treatments.  The only units for which a causal effect of perceived vic-
tim race on penalty is defined are Units 3 and 6.  Because the analyst 
observes Table 7 with its missing values, not the fully filled-in Table 8, 
his or her task is to use statistical techniques to fill in the missing val-
ues in the two “Conviction if . . .” columns in Table 7, isolate the units 
for which both “Conviction if . . .” columns have the value “Yes,” fill in 
the missing values in the two “Death if . . .” columns, and then (say) 
calculate an average death penalty rate using the now-completed po-
tential outcomes columns.  There are various methods the analyst 
might use to accomplish the first and third steps, and a choice among 
them might require some familiarity with sophisticated mathematical 
principles.  But nothing in understanding the problem requires any-
thing technical.109 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  109  The capital punishment problem outlined above is structurally identical to a set of statistical 
issues in the biomedical context that are referred to, alas, as “censoring by death” or “truncation 
due to death.”  See, e.g., Junni L. Zhang & Donald B. Rubin, Estimation of Causal Effects via 
Principal Stratification When Some Outcomes Are Truncated by “Death,” 28 J. EDUC. & BEHAV. 
STAT. 353, 354 (2003); see also Constantine E. Frangakis & Donald B. Rubin, Principal Stratifica-
tion in Causal Inference, 58 BIOMETRICS 21 (2002).  As before, see supra note 17, ownership 
over the recognition of this problem is disputed.  Compare Zhang & Rubin, supra, and Frangakis 
& Rubin, supra, with James Robins & Sander Greenland, Estimability and Estimation of Ex-
pected Years of Life Lost Due to a Hazardous Exposure, 10 STAT. MED. 79 (1991). 
    To my knowledge, no study has done what is required to make valid causal inferences about 
jury decisions at the penalty phase, that is, to remove units from the study for which a treatment 
effect is undefined.  To the contrary, the issue articulated above usually has either gone unrecog-
nized or has been presumed to be amenable to solution via modeling, such as with a properly 
specified regression.  In fact, regression cannot solve this problem because the issue is one of data 
collection and question identification, not modeling technique.  Note that the Baldus study, 
BALDUS ET AL., supra note 7, suffered from this problem, along with the difficulty of including 
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2.  Employment Discrimination. — Employment discrimination ex-
amples appear throughout this Article to illustrate basic concepts.   
Moreover, the number and kind of employment decisions subject to 
challenge under antidiscrimination laws render complete coverage in 
this area in a few pages impossible.  Thus, this section is limited to a 
few general principles, as well as to identification of issues that require 
further research. 
First, the problem of data with undefined outcomes due to crucial 
intermediate variables appears in employment discrimination analysis 
on a larger scale than in the death penalty context above.  Technically, 
it does not make sense to discuss whether an employee actually per-
ceived male would have received a promotion had that employee been 
perceived female if, had the employee been perceived female, he/she 
would not have been hired in the first place.  If an analyst assessing a 
promotion discrimination claim examines all units currently eligible to 
receive the promotion, she is using a dataset that is contaminated by 
units as to which a counterfactual comparison makes no perfect theo-
retical sense.  A second issue that stands out as troublesome in the em-
ployment discrimination context is the tug-of-war identified above, 
that is, the problem of what variables to include in a balancing process 
given that gender and race are perceived (treatment is applied) so early 
in the employee-defendant relationship.  Much here may depend on 
whether the law chooses to characterize events as separate or related.  
In the capital punishment context, the Supreme Court has recognized 
a strong connection between the guilt and penalty phases of a capital 
trial,110 triggering the problem illustrated by Tables 7–8, above.  Per-
haps in certain employment discrimination contexts, hiring and promo-
tion constitute legally separate transactions or occurrences.111 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
intermediate outcomes in the right-hand side of its regression equations.  See Greiner & Rubin, 
supra note 94, manuscript at 23. 
  110  See supra note 107. 
  111  See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157–59 (1982) (holding that the class 
action representativeness requirement prevented a plaintiff who alleged that he personally suf-
fered race discrimination in promotion from being the named plaintiff for a class that alleged race 
discrimination in hiring).  However, as Judge Goldberg has pointed out, in certain contexts, such 
as when the hiring and promotion decisionmakers are the same, conceptualizing hiring and pro-
motion as separate events makes little sense.  See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 
791, 803–06 (5th Cir. 1986) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), vacated, 487 U.S. 977 (1988); see also Stuart 
v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 452 (1st Cir. 1991) (collecting cases in which courts have permitted em-
ployment discrimination plaintiffs to link hiring and promotion).  My thanks to an anonymous 
reviewer for referring me to both opinions. 
    For a discussion of estimation issues that arise when related employment processes are ana-
lyzed separately, see Joseph L. Gastwirth, Statistical Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 160 J. 
ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y SER. A 289, 293–95 (1997).  The point made in the text of this Article is dif-
ferent in that it goes to the definition of a causal effect as opposed to estimation, but this differ-
ence just demonstrates that the issue of whether, when, and how to atomize long-term relation-
ships among units and decisionmakers has multiple facets.    
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This discussion demonstrates that difficult, fundamental issues may 
arise over and over in categories of employment discrimination cases.  
Regression as used in modern civil rights litigation does not avoid 
these issues; it masks them.  Thus, expert witnesses, litigators, and 
courts will be required to make delicate judgments.  It will not do to 
render the employment discrimination laws wholly inapplicable to en-
tire classes of lawsuits because we currently lack a statistical frame-
work that will satisfy all skeptics.112  Nor will it do to allow defen-
dants to prevail in any cases in which they point out that the ideal 
data are not available; the ideal data are never available.  Assumptions 
that might make the quantitative analyst “blush”113 outside the litiga-
tion setting, particularly with respect to the characteristics of persons a 
firm does not hire (as to which covariate information may not be 
available or recoverable), must be seriously assessed and explored.   
Obviously, a prerequisite to such a process of exploration and assess-
ment is that the assumptions be stated clearly.  Moreover, experts, liti-
gators, and courts need not be satisfied in all instances with the infor-
mation available in a defendant’s computer files.  In some cases, paper 
records can be searched and coded; in others, surveys may be adminis-
tered to reconstruct lost or previously unavailable information. 
The key point here is that in most employment discrimination con-
texts, we can identify the units, the treatment, a timing of treatment 
application, the outcome of interest, and the variables that might be 
subject to balancing.  We can assess critical assumptions, such as non-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  112  Consider the following passage: 
Scientifically, the strength of the case against smoking rests not so much on the P-values, 
but more on the size of the effect, on its coherence and on extensive replication both 
with the original research design and with many other designs. . . .   
  . . . . 
  The results of the studies on smoking are generally coherent in the following ways: 
(i) There is a dose-response relationship: persons who smoke more heavily have greater 
risks of disease than those who smoke less.  (ii) The risk from smoking increases with the 
duration of exposure.  (iii) Among those who quit smoking, excess risk decreases with 
time after exposure stopped. 
David Freedman, From Association to Causation: Some Remarks on the History of Statistics, 14 
STAT. SCI. 243, 253 (1999).  Requiring this level of proof before reaching a conclusion is a respect-
able viewpoint for a scientist, one who is interested in investigating and establishing universal 
truths.  It will not do for a court, which must either (i) work toward finding the best possible an-
swer in a particular dispute under a tight (by social science standards) timeline, or (ii) always rule 
against the party with the burden of proof.  See Joseph L. Gastwirth, Some Issues Arising in the 
Presentation of Statistical Testimony, 4 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 5, 5–7 (2005); Steven L. Will-
born, A Lawyer’s View of the Statistical Expert, 4 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 25, 26 (2005). 
  113  As Judge Higginbotham has noted: 
In countless areas of the law weighty legal conclusions frequently rest on methodologies 
that would make scientists blush.  The use of such blunt instruments in examining com-
plex phenomena and corresponding reliance on inference owes not so much to a lack of 
technical sophistication among judges, although this is often true, but to an awareness 
that greater certitude frequently may be purchased only at the expense of other values.   
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 860 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).    
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interference among units.  Some uncomfortable additional assumptions 
may be necessary to proceed in actual cases, but at least we can ask 
coherent questions linked to available data.  As the next section dem-
onstrates, such is not always the case in civil rights litigation. 
3.  Causation and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. — Since 
Thornburg v. Gingles,114 it has been clear that section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act prohibits dilution of minority voting strength115 and that an 
essential part of a plaintiff’s case in a section 2 lawsuit is proof of ra-
cial bloc voting,116 which until recently was attempted primarily via 
regression.117  Among the innumerable unresolved issues in this area is 
whether a plaintiff’s prima facie case requires a causal element of 
some kind, either as part of the proof of racial bloc voting or later at a 
“totality-of-circumstances” stage.118  Courts adjudicating this issue de-
scribe the causal element in various ways.  Examples include (i) a fo-
cus on “the reasons why white voters reject[] minority candidates”;119 
(ii) “an inquiry into the cause for the correlation [between voter race 
and voter preferences] (to determine, for example, whether [the corre-
lation] might be the product of similar socioeconomic interests rather 
than some other factor related to race)”;120 (iii) a need to eliminate 
party affiliation or party preferences as a cause of voting patterns;121 
and (iv) whether any vote dilution observed is “being caused by the in-
teraction of racial bias in the voting community and the challenged 
scheme.”122 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  114  478 U.S. 30 (1986).  
  115  See id.; see also Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 885 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment); id. at 961–63 (separate opinion of Stevens, J.). 
  116  This discussion assumes knowledge of basic section 2 law, including the three Gingles pre-
requisites, the totality-of-circumstances test, and the so-called “Senate Report” factors.  See Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973(b) (2000)); Clark v. Calhoun County, Miss., 21 F.3d 92 (5th Cir. 1994); Colleton County 
Council v. McConnell, 201 F. Supp. 2d 618, 632 n.13 (D.S.C. 2002); S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 
(1982). 
  117  See Greiner, supra note 12, at app. A; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 
126 S. Ct. 2594, 2657 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, 
and dissenting in part) (“At trials, assumptions and assertions give way to facts.  In voting rights 
cases, that is typically done through regression analyses of past voting records.”). 
  118  See supra note 116. 
  119  Gingles, 478 U.S. at 100 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
  120  Holder, 512 U.S. at 904 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  Notice how quickly doc-
trinal confusion in this area emerges.  Usually, for socioeconomic circumstances to provide an al-
ternative explanation for voting patterns that are related to race, these circumstances would need 
to be themselves related to race.  But the relation of socioeconomic circumstances and race is a 
Senate Report factor tending to support a finding of vote dilution, at least when (as is usually the 
case in this country) minority race is related to less advantageous socioeconomic conditions. 
  121  See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 859 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(en banc); Baird v. Consol. Indianapolis, 976 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992). 
  122  Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1497 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc).    
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The judiciary has spilled a fair amount of ink on this subject, with 
the prevailing view being that section 2 does contemplate some sort of 
causal inquiry.123  Much of the debate has been doctrinal and is thus 
beyond the scope of this Article, but one can learn important things 
about the nature of causal inference by examining how courts actually 
apply the concept of causation in the section 2 context.  That examina-
tion should begin with two preliminary observations.  First, the causal 
inquiry, however defined, appears to matter little in actual cases unless 
the factual record demonstrates that candidates of minority race have 
enjoyed some measure of electoral success.124  Second, the only addi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  123  The debate has concerned at least three broad issues.  First, there is the threshold question 
of whether section 2 vote dilution plaintiffs must prove any sort of causation.  This issue was one 
(among several) over which the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, divided equally in Solomon v. 
Liberty County, Florida, 899 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1990), and later resolved for circuit purposes in 
Nipper, 39 F.3d 1494.  The en banc Fifth Circuit also split, although a majority supported the 
view that section 2 requires causal proof.  League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 999 F.2d at 856; 
id. at 901–12 (King, J., dissenting).  In addition, note that the Supreme Court recently found a 
section 2 violation without mentioning causation.  See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 
Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006). 
    Second, courts have disagreed on whether the causal element of proof, whatever it means, is 
(i) part of the third Gingles prerequisite (white bloc voting usually sufficient to defeat the minor-
ity’s preferred candidate); (ii) part of the totality of circumstances; or (iii) synonymous with a sec-
tion 2 vote dilution claim, when joined with a potentially dilutive electoral structure such as an 
at-large districting scheme or a gerrymander.  The Fifth Circuit appears to favor the first choice.  
See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 999 F.2d at 856–58.  The First, Second, Fourth, and 
Seventh Circuits appear to prefer the second.  See United States v. Charleston County, S.C., 365 
F.3d 341, 347–48 (4th Cir. 2004); Goosby v. Town Board, 180 F.3d 476, 493 (2d Cir. 1999); Mil-
waukee Branch of NAACP v. Thompson, 116 F.3d 1194, 1199–1200 (7th Cir. 1997); Vecinos de 
Barrio Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 983 & n.4 (1st Cir. 1995).  Note that the NAACP opin-
ion is not perfectly clear on this point.  Finally, the Eleventh Circuit appears to espouse the third 
choice.  See Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1514–15.  Unfortunately, this matter is not one of mere doctrinal 
nicety, because most courts at least give lip service to the proposition that “it will be only the very 
unusual case in which the plaintiffs can establish the existence of the three Gingles factors but still 
have failed to establish a violation of § 2 under the totality of circumstances.”  Clark v. Calhoun 
County, Miss., 21 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1135 (3d Cir. 1993)); see also NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, N.Y., 65 F.3d 
1002, 1019 n.21 (2d Cir. 1995). 
   Third, the courts have divided on which party has the burden of proof on causation.  The 
Fifth Circuit essentially places the burden on the plaintiffs, where it remains at all times.  See 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 999 F.2d at 856–58.  Other courts, while purporting to es-
chew formal burden-shifting, have stated that if plaintiffs prove the three Gingles prerequisites 
and the defendant is mute on the issue, plaintiffs are deemed to have prevailed on this question.  
See Vecinos de Barrio Uno, 72 F.3d at 983 & n.4; Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1524 & n.61, 1525 n.64.  
Other judges would adopt formal burden-shifting.  See Goosby, 180 F.3d at 502–03 (Leval, J., 
concurring);  League of United Latin Am. Citizens,  999 F.2d at 902–04,  910–12 (King, J.,   
dissenting). 
  124  As this Article does not attempt a comprehensive examination of all section 2 cases over a 
particular time period, support for the statement above comes from a review of several circuit 
court cases grappling with the causation issue, as well as some subsequent rulings.  In particular, 
consider the following three illustrations.  First, in League of United Latin American Citizens v. 
Clements, the case in which the en banc Fifth Circuit first adopted a causation element in the sec-
tion 2 context, the court relied exclusively on the success of Republican candidates of minority 
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tional evidence occasionally brought to the table to address the   
causation issue, apart from that which addresses the laundry list of 
factors courts would otherwise consult at the section 2 totality-of-
circumstances stage, is whether white voter support for a minority-
preferred candidate is generally lower if the candidate is of minority 
race or ethnicity (as opposed to white).125  These two facts suggest 
that, to the extent courts really do focus on causation when adjudicat-
ing section 2 cases (as opposed to when articulating section 2 doctrine), 
they are attempting to draw an inference about the effect of the race of 
the candidate, or (worse yet) the race of voters, on election results. 
A potential outcomes understanding of causation pays dividends in 
this context by demonstrating that neither inquiry can be coherently 
linked to available data.  Consider an attempt to assess the effect of 
the race of the candidate on election results.  One can identify the 
treatment as (perceived) candidate race and, at least initially, the out-
come of interest as election wins and losses or perhaps vote tallies.  If 
vote tallies or election results are the outcomes of interest, then the in-
stitutional or socioeconomic actor whose behavior we are interested in 
assessing is the set of persons eligible to vote in each election.  So far 
so good.  Identifying the units presents more difficulties; if we consider 
units to be electoral contests, the fact that candidates usually run more 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
race to hold that party, not race, best “explained” observed voting patterns.  999 F.2d at 877–80.  
Later, however, in Clark v. Calhoun County, Mississippi, the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court 
holding in favor of a section 2 defendant without mentioning causation, although the court did 
examine success of candidates of minority race, as 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) compelled it to do.  88 F.3d 
1393, 1400 (5th Cir. 1996).  Both opinions were authored by Judge Higginbotham.  See also Jones 
v. City of Lubbock, 730 F.2d 233, 235 (5th Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J., concurring in denial of 
petition for rehearing en banc).  Second, in Nipper v. Smith, the Eleventh Circuit spent more than 
fifteen pages justifying its pronouncements that section 2 included a causal element.  39 F.3d at 
1509–27.  In strongly implying that the requisite causation had been proven, however, the en banc 
court simply looked to the Gingles factors, weighed the totality of circumstances, and examined 
special circumstances of the case (there, the unusual considerations attendant to a vote dilution 
claim when the offices at issue are judicial).  Id.  All of these steps are ones the court would have 
taken in a section 2 discussion lacking any focus on causation.  Third, after the First Circuit held 
in Vecinos de Barrio Uno, 72 F.3d at 981, that section 2 includes some causal element, a three-
judge court sitting in Massachusetts found a section 2 violation in a districting scheme for the 
state legislature.  Black Political Task Force v. Galvin, 300 F. Supp. 2d 291 (D. Mass. 2004).  The 
three-judge court’s analysis of causation consisted of the following phrase: “We have also in-
quired into causation where appropriate . . . .”  Id. at 313.  Judge Selya authored both Vecinos de 
Barrio Uno and Galvin. 
   Again, identifying the important role the success of candidates of minority race apparently 
plays in the causation inquiry does little to clear up the doctrinal confusion in this area.  Courts 
would examine the success of minority candidates as a factor in the section 2 context apart from 
any causal focus.  42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000). 
  125  See, e.g., Charleston County, 365 F.3d at 350 (noting that voting polarization increased when 
a black candidate ran against a white candidate); Old Person v. Cooney, 230 F.3d 1113, 1128 (9th 
Cir. 2000); see also Goosby, 180 F.3d at 495–98 (rejecting a party-not-race argument primarily be-
cause of the defendant jurisdiction’s candidate-slating process, which is itself the fourth Senate 
Report factor).    
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than once renders the ordinary assumption that units do not interfere 
with one another hogwash.  In other words, to maintain the non-
interference assumption, we would have to assume away things like 
the incumbency effect and the coattails phenomenon.126  If we consider 
units to be candidates, it becomes hard to define the outcome of inter-
est; which of several potential contests in which a single candidate 
runs should one examine, or should one combine them in some way 
over time? 
The problem of sharply defining units, however, pales in compari-
son to the issue of identifying the timing of the treatment administra-
tion.  The reasoning courts employ in their discussions of causation 
demonstrates their desire to conceptualize the effect of perceived can-
didate race as of election day.  This desire is evident from the fact that 
courts contemplate separating the effect of candidate race from the ef-
fect of funding levels, party loyalty, incumbency, use of the media, and 
a laundry list of other factors,127 some of which continue to change up 
until voters enter polling booths.  Courts (and some commentators) an-
ticipate accomplishing this task by using “multi-variate mathematical 
inquiry,”128 adding variables to regression equations,129 or employing 
“properly specified models,”130 which are all complicated ways of say-
ing that certain variables should be included on the right-hand side of 
a regression equation. 
We are in trouble here.  Recall the presumption that treatment 
should be conceptualized as having been administered as of the mo-
ment of first interaction between the unit (here, the candidate, or the 
candidate in a given election) and the socioeconomic or institutional 
actor of interest (here, the members of the public eligible to vote).  The 
public perceives a candidate’s race long before election day.  Mean-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  126  This is another example demonstrating that the assumption of non-interference among units 
can be difficult to recognize and, when recognized, can be fairly startling.  See supra note 69. 
  127  See, e.g., Vecinos de Barrio Uno, 72 F.3d at 983 n.4 (“[F]actors might include . . . lack of 
funds, want of campaign experience, the unattractiveness of particular candidates, or the univer-
sal popularity of an opponent.”); City of Lubbock, 730 F.2d at 235 (Higginbotham, J., concurring 
in denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (“[O]ther explanatory factors [might be] . . . campaign 
expenditure, party identification, income, media use measured by cost, religion, name identifica-
tion, or distance that a candidate lived from any particular precinct.”); Black Political Task Force, 
300 F. Supp. 2d at 313–15 (finding that incumbency played a significant role in redistricting). 
  128  See City of Lubbock, 730 F.2d at 234; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 999 F.2d 
at 859 (“detailed multivariate analysis”). 
  129  See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 904 n.13 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); 
see also Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 433–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
  130  See Charles S. Bullock, III, Misinformation and Misperceptions: A Little Knowledge Can 
Be Dangerous,  72 S OC.  SCI.  Q.  834,  838 ( 1991);  see also Richard L. Engstrom & Michael D. 
McDonald, Definitions, Measurements, and Statistics: Weeding Wildgen’s Thicket, 20 URB. LAW. 
175, 177 (1988) (referring to “multivariate causal analysis”).  But see Bernard Grofman, Multi-
variate Methods and the Analysis of Racially Polarized Voting: Pitfalls in the Use of Social Sci-
ence by the Courts, 72 SOC. SCI. Q. 826, 828 (1991).    
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while, courts have fits.  For example, they alternately consider the 
same circumstance, minority candidates’ difficulty in raising funds, as 
favoring both section 2 plaintiffs and section 2 defendants.131  The fact 
is, both positions make sense, depending on the timing of treatment 
application.  If one considers the treatment of perceived race as being 
administered on election day, difficulty in raising funds is a covariate 
that should be subject to balancing, which will often favor the defen-
dant.  If one considers the treatment as administered earlier, perhaps 
at some moment of perception by a part of the voting polity, difficulty 
in raising funds is an intermediate outcome that should not be subject 
to balancing, which will often benefit the plaintiff. 
Is there something special about the electoral process that would al-
low treatment assignment to be conceptualized later than the moment 
potential voters first observe a candidate’s race, such as on the day of 
the election?  In a word, no.  To the contrary, what we think we know 
about elections suggests that departing from the ordinary presumption 
about the timing of treatment application is more dangerous here than 
elsewhere.  There is no point in rehashing arguments already made to 
the effect that perceived race affects campaign contributions, party 
loyalty, incumbency, access to the media, and most if not all of the 
laundry list of other factors courts point to as potential nonracial 
causes for election results.  It is worth pausing to point out that one of 
the dangers here is the same as the danger in the smoking, lung cancer, 
and death example articulated above.  By analogy to the courts’ sec-
tion  2 reasoning, if a statistician looks for an effect of smoking on 
death rates after balancing on the occurrence of lung cancer, diabetes, 
heart disease, throat ailments, or other similar variables, she will 
probably end up concluding that smoking is a healthy habit that all of 
us should make a part of our daily lives. 
The real point here is that the courts are the ones making strong 
and implausible assumptions, not section 2 litigants who argue that 
race affects election results by way of affecting the alternative vari-
ables upon which courts would focus.  That is, by conceptualizing 
treatment application as occurring on election day, courts are assuming 
that a candidate’s race has no effect on his or her ability to raise funds, 
command party discipline and loyalty, campaign, or gain access to the 
media, all this while deeming it worthwhile to study whether candi-
date race has an effect on votes cast.  It is one thing to say that candi-
date race may have no effect on these other variables; it is another to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  131  Compare, e.g., Vecinos de Barrio Uno, 72 F.3d at 983 n.4 (listing “lack of funds” as an alter-
native, non-racial explanation for voting patterns, suggesting exoneration of a section 2 defen-
dant), with United States v. Charleston County, S.C., 365 F.3d 341, 352 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating 
that lack of funds makes it difficult for minority candidates to compete in districts of larger size, 
such as multi-member districts).    
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assume that no such effects exist, while simultaneously deeming it use-
ful to study whether candidate race affects voter behavior.  One would 
not, without justification based in evidence, assume that smoking has 
no effect on risk of lung cancer, diabetes, and heart disease, and never-
theless deem it worthwhile to study whether smoking has an effect on 
risk of death. 
Judges, or at least some judges, understand some of these princi-
ples.132  What they do not appear to understand, and what is a fun-
damental lesson of this Article, is that no multivariate mathematical 
inquiry, no regression equation, no properly specified model, no 
amount of common sense and intuitive assessment, and no (to borrow 
a favorite judicial phrase) examination of all the facts and circum-
stances can solve this problem.  The difficulty stems from a failure to 
identify a plausible time for treatment assignment, and thus a failure 
to articulate a coherent question linked to available data. 
Is it possible to articulate a coherent causal question in the section 
2 context by conceptualizing treatment as administered at a time ear-
lier than election day?  I have been unable to do so.  One might try to 
focus on the moment a potential candidate announces his or her can-
didacy.  But commentators and courts know that potential candidates 
choose the offices they run for only after serious thought as to their 
prospects for winning,133 and such a calculation must include the ra-
cial preferences of voters, party officials, and potential contributors, all 
of which potential candidates probably know better than do Article III 
judges.134  It would be unwise to assume, in a study designed to assess 
the effects of candidate race, that no such strategic thinking occurs.  
Worse, race may affect a candidate’s behavior years before she con-
templates running for office, perhaps at the candidate’s initial choice 
of party affiliation.  Again, one need not be certain that such an effect 
in fact exists.  One must, however, ask whether it is plausible (or 
worthwhile) to assume that it does not exist and simultaneously study 
whether race affects voting behavior on election day. 
At the most fundamental level, the difficulties here are the result of 
three overarching factors.  The first is the tug-of-war articulated in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  132  See in particular the cogent discussion in United States v. Charleston County, S.C., 316 F. 
Supp.  2d  268,  300–03  (D.S.C.  2003), and the more economic-based examination in Milwaukee 
Branch of NAACP v. Thompson, 116 F.3d 1194, 1198–200 (7th Cir. 1997). 
  133  See, e.g., GARY C. JACOBSON & SAMUEL KERNELL, STRATEGY AND CHOICE IN CON-
GRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 19, 35 (2d ed. 1983); V.O. KEY, JR., THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTOR-
ATE 7 (1966).  Both the Charleston County and NAACP courts explicitly recognized this fact; in 
the former case, there was testimony to this effect.  See NAACP, 116 F.3d at 1198; Charleston 
County, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 278 n.13. 
  134  Putting aside questions of institutional competence, potential witnesses hoping to run for 
office in the future have powerful incentives not to testify truthfully and completely on such   
subjects.    
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section III.A.2.  The long (often decades-long) time period between the 
moment of first candidate-electorate interaction and vote tallies ren-
ders the tug-of-war tension particularly evident. 
The second overarching factor is the nature of the institutional or 
socioeconomic actor whose behavior we are attempting to assess.  “The 
electorate” (more accurately, the potential electorate) is a complicated 
mass of individuals whose choices and motivations change over time 
and whose actions even at a particular time point are difficult to un-
derstand.  The employment discrimination context was hard enough, 
but there we had the advantage of not being concerned about the po-
tential for someone else’s discrimination; only the employer’s behavior 
mattered.  In the section 2 context, by contrast, judges must assess vot-
ers’ “opportunity . . . to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice,” and applicable law directs them to 
consider the “totality of circumstances.”135  The entire political system 
is fair game.136 
The third overarching factor is strategic thinking on the part of 
persons contemplating a run for political office.  In terms of the vo-
cabulary used in this Article, treatment assignment has occurred before 
treatment application — the potential candidate knows what the elec-
torate will perceive his or her race to be before she enters the electoral 
contest.  The previous portions of this Article have used the terms 
“treatment assignment” and “treatment application” interchangeably 
because in many situations the two occur (or can be conceptualized as 
occurring) simultaneously.  That will not do here.  Potential political 
candidates are hyper-strategic actors.137 
The above discussion has doctrinal implications: until resolved, the 
problems discussed here are a reason to interpret section 2 as not in-
cluding a causal element.  If courts feel that other doctrinal considera-
tions, considerations beyond the scope of this Article, compel some 
kind of causal inquiry in the section 2 context, they should at least de-
fine sharply (i) the units, (ii) the treatment, (iii) the timing of treatment 
administration, (iv) the outcomes of interest, and (v) the relationships 
the units have to one another (for example, how to handle interference 
among units caused by the incumbency and coattail effects).  They 
should then articulate how available data have any information on the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  135  Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000). 
  136  The above discussion should make clear that matters are far worse if one shifts the treat-
ment definition from the race of the candidate to the races of the voters.  Which voters?  When is 
treatment applied? 
  137  Recently, scholars have begun to examine the challenges for causal inference that occur 
when units take action between treatment assignment and treatment application, anticipating the 
results of that application.  See, e.g., Gerard J. van den Berg, An Economic Analysis of Exclusion 
Restrictions for Instrumental Variable Estimation (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper 
No. 2585, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=964965.    
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questions identified.  Perhaps courts will succeed in doing what I have 
been unable to do.  Until they do so, they are interpreting the statute 
to include a nonsensical question. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The potential outcomes framework is not so much a solution to 
problems of causal inference in the civil rights context as it is a coher-
ent structure within which to attempt to solve problems.  Its adoption 
would constitute progress, not a final answer.  The framework pro-
vides a way to reduce expert witness bias, assess whether questions in 
litigation are at the present time answerable, and identify unrealistic 
assumptions, all within a definition of causation accessible to judges 
and juries.  The paradigm helps clarify the data that must be collected 
to implement studies with believable conclusions, and it does a better 
job of forcing quantitative analysts to articulate the assumptions re-
quired to use data to provide answers to questions of interest. 
Adoption of the potential outcomes framework would make analy-
ses better, not easier.  One of the attractive, but dangerous, characteris-
tics of regression as used in modern civil rights litigation is that it is so 
simple to implement.  At least, the initial steps of regression are easy to 
implement; the process of assessing fit, attempting different equations, 
etc., requires more effort.  Comparatively speaking, however, much of 
the process of implementing a regression as it is used in modern civil 
rights litigation does not require as much effort as would implementing 
the potential outcomes framework.  Implementing a potential out-
comes causal analysis in the civil rights context requires work before 
the analyst sits down in front of the computer: work in identifying 
units, treatment, timing of treatment assignment, and outcomes of in-
terest, along with work in maximizing the plausibility of initial as-
sumptions.  If these initial stages go well, more hard work is required 
to identify and balance covariates.  Only then, after all of the “design” 
phase of the study is over, does the “analysis” phase become simpler.  
Reasoned judgment is required at every step.  Fortunately, the higher-
quality result is worth the extra work. 
Much remains to be done in this area.  This Article focuses on gen-
der, race, and national origin discrimination and shows that many 
hurdles still exist.  Age claims are another matter.  Here, an initial 
challenge is to identify the treatment — the counterfactual.138  But the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  138  For example, imagine a 60-year-old employee with thirty years of experience in a given field 
and an expectation of being able to work for another eight years.  Should this employee be com-
pared for age discrimination purposes to (i) a 40-year-old worker with ten years of experience and 
the expectation of eight more years of work, (ii) a 40-year-old worker with ten years of experience 
and twenty-eight more expected work years, (iii) a 40-year-old with thirty years of experience and 
eight more expected work years, (iv) a 60-year-old worker with thirty years experience and 
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benefits of the potential outcomes framework are evident: experts, liti-
gators, and courts are forced to articulate their questions clearly, which 
requires close consideration of statutory objectives and policy goals.  
The results should be not just more accurate quantitative answers, but 
better law. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
twenty-eight more expected work years, or (v) something else?  Finding actual employees with 
some of these profiles to donate outcome values could prove difficult. 